Debates in Aesthetics is a peer-reviewed, open-access journal for articles, interviews and book reviews. The journal’s principal aim is to provide the philosophical community with a dedicated venue for debate in aesthetics and the philosophy of art.
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It is our great pleasure to introduce a new editor of Debates in Aesthetics (DiA), Sarah Kiernan, and the 2021 general issue. In this issue there are three original articles that explore a multitude of topics including: the nature of architectural value (Drummond); whether there can be authorless works of fiction (Schuppert); and the relation between light art and somaesthetic experience (Risco Ruiz). There is also an interview with Rafe McGregor, where he discusses his recent book, *Narrative Justice* (Rajter).

In his article, ‘Architectural Value and the Artistic Value of Architecture’, Drummond seeks to demarcate architectural value from artistic value. He motivates the necessity of this project by claiming that, within philosophical discussion of architecture as an artform, architectural value and artistic value are often referred to interchangeably with no explicit differentiation between them. Nevertheless, a convergence between these two values is seldom supported or argued for overtly, so Drummond refers to the assumption of their equivalence as the implicit...
claim. Drummond argues against this implicit claim with the goal of showing that architectural value has an independent significance that extends beyond what is attributed to architecture by virtue of its classification as a subgenre of the arts.

Importantly, the article maintains that architecture can possess artistic value despite some controversy regarding its status as an artform; in fact, Drummond identifies this as a source of confusion between architectural and artistic value and even declares it to be an origin of the implicit claim. He analyses three potential reasons for upholding the implicit claim. These three reasons are: the *categories argument*, which holds that architecture is a different category from ‘mere buildings’ (2021, 17) solely because of its artistic value; the *attributive argument*, which is based on the idea that both artistic and architectural value are an attributive goodness; and the *constitution argument*, which highlights the similarities between the properties which denote artistic and architectural value. Drummond goes on to argue convincingly that, on the contrary, each of these apparent motivations for the implicit claim can in fact provide evidence for a clear distinction between architectural and artistic value.

Due to the lack of explicit endorsements for the implicit claim, it could be objected that it is less prevalent than Drummond’s paper supposes. However, Drummond is cautious not to misrepresent or make assumptions regarding the views of previous commentators. Moreover, the contribution of clarity and terminological certainty that Drummond’s paper offers should not be undervalued. His paper presents an approach to this topic that is exceptional in the transparency with which it discusses the distinction between architectural value and the artistic value of architecture.

Drummond’s position is very much aligned with the views of other philosophers cited in the paper such as Stephen Davies and Larry Shiner. Drummond agrees with Stephen Davies (2007) that some but
not all works of architecture are works of art and a distinction between architectural value and artistic value is compatible with Davies’ assertion that architecture is not an artform but that works of architecture can also be artworks. The same can be said for Larry Shiner’s cited work on function in architecture (2011). Furthermore, Drummond builds upon recent literature from Louise Hanson (2017) which argues that artistic value is attributive goodness rather than predicative goodness and applies this principle separately to architectural value. By utilising Hanson’s distinction, Drummond’s paper brings freshness and contemporary relevance to the topic of architectural value.

Drummond concludes that architectural value and artistic value are distinct because they are constituted by different components and that the difference between architectural value and artistic value is fundamentally related to function. The various potential components of artistic and architectural value are listed by Drummond, but there is ample potential for further discussion of these factors in future papers. In particular, the importance of function as a distinguishing factor between architectural and artistic value would benefit from greater specificity and development. It would be intriguing to investigate how the role of function in differentiating artistic value and architectural value could relate to the Kantian notions of adherent beauty and free beauty.

As a final point, Drummond highlights the plausibility of examples that are perceived to have more architectural value than artistic value or vice versa, because of how they succeed or fail at fulfilling an architectural function. In future work, it would be excellent to see Drummond demonstrate this point through the discussion of further real-world examples. It would be fascinating to see if the author believes the architecture of Antoni Gaudi has artistic value that exceeds its architectural value or if the distinctive skyscrapers of London’s skyline have an architectural value beyond their artistic value.

In his article, Schuppert explores the question of whether, in addition to
works and readers, fictions require authors. As he outlines, this question has caused division among theorists, including Gregory Currie and Kendall Walton, who have proposed that fictions prescribe imaginings. The former has opted for, what Schuppert calls, ‘fictive intentionalism’ (2021, 33), which entails the view that fictions are made – they are communicative and intentional, while the latter has taken a ‘fictive anti-intentionalist’ approach, according to which fictions function – the products work in a particular manner, rather than attaching to particular actions. Walton used a thought experiment to demonstrate this, which consisted of a naturally occurring story formed from cracks in a rock that spell out “Once upon a time there were three bears...” It is postulated that while realizing there is no author for the story, we can still read and enjoy the story much in the same way as if it had an author – the stones also seem to make imagining that there are three bears, rather than other creatures, appropriate. As Schuppert outlines: “Correlatively, it clearly seems to be fictional or true in the fiction that there are three bears.” (2021, 36) In response to this thought experiment, Currie has argued that the natural story is not a work of fiction, but ‘pseudofiction’, where we might treat the shapes formed from the cracks as if they were fiction (Currie 1990, 36).

Although this put an end to the debate for many philosophers, Schuppert reopens the case first by arguing that Currie’s response establishes that, as per his theory, the natural story is not a fiction. Schuppert demonstrates that Walton’s functionalist framework does in fact accommodate the kind of conceptual separation proposed by Currie, but can still maintain that authorless fiction can exist. Drawing upon one of the four conceptions - a relativist concept of function (it is possible that something is fiction in one society but not another) - that Walton offers to explain why we might have mixed intuitions about certain cases, Schuppert argues that “it truly is an authorless fiction for us because we would use and understand it as such.” (2021, 44) Furthermore, Schuppert argues that an actual author theory of fictionality fails to explain
why there is good reason to imagine the ‘Cracks in a Rock’ story, while a nonactual author theory of fictionality could entail the counterintuitive consequence that pseudofiction turns out to be metafiction, whereby we imagine that there are three bears “because we infer that a fictional author believes that a fictional author believes that there are three bears.” (2021, 47) In light of these considerations, Schuppert concludes that Walton’s thought experiment still provides good reasons to argue in favour of fictive, and also fictional, anti-intentionalism.

Schuppert’s work then, demonstrates the possibility of natural fictions, which, given recent developments in aesthetics, has some interesting consequences for accounts pertaining to the nature of art forms. Christy Mag Uidhir for instance, has argued that an art form must be strongly author-relevant.1 More specifically, Mag Uidhir has proposed that something is an artwork “only if intentions substantively figure in the thing coming to have the required features, whatever those may be.” (2013, 23) To be an art form is to be an author-relevant sort, among which Mag Uidhir counts paintings, sculptures, poems, and novels. In each of these forms, there is necessarily an agent who is directly responsible for the way in which that thing is a painting, or a sculpture, and so forth. The same however, he argues is not true of photographs and so “the sortal photograph is not substantively intention dependent (i.e. strongly author-relevant).” (2013, 103) This Mag Uidhir has reasoned is because, as art is intention-dependent, “purely natural objects can’t be art.” (2013, 23) He argues that for a photograph to be an artwork, it must be “photography-plus”, that is containing some non-photographic, or extra-photographic, feature from an art sortal (Mag Uidhir 2013, 105). However, Mag Uidhir’s inclusion of the novel among strongly author-relevant categories might be at risk, if, as Schuppert has proposed, we have greater reason to favour fictive anti-intentionalism over fictive intentionalism. Just as the reaction of photosensitive surfaces to light might be author-

less, there might be authorless fictions. Clearly, fiction is not exhaustive of what constitutes a novel, but then neither is the reaction of photosensitive surfaces to light exhaustive of what constitutes a photograph. Why then should we accept that the sortal novel is strongly author relevant, while photography is not? This is just one among many interesting consequences of Schuppert’s arguments.

In Risco Ruiz’s article ‘The contemplative walking in light: Somaesthetic experience in the projects of Ann Veronica Janssens and Olafur Eliasson’ she explores the aesthetic attitude that is adopted by viewers during the experience of certain contemporary art installations involving light. The article focuses on two select examples of light installation from leading contemporary artists: Your Rainbow Panorama (2011) by Olafur Eliasson and YellowBluePink (2015) by Ann Veronica Janssens. These artworks are both characterised by the way in which the audience experiences the artwork by being immersed in and moving through coloured light, and they have been selected to demonstrate what the author calls ‘contemplative walking in light’ (2021, 52) as a distinct somaesthetic form (that is, a subjective state that holistically integrates the mental and emotional elements of aesthetic experience with bodily sensation).

In many ways, Risco Ruiz’s article feels akin to the aesthetic experience of light art that is its subject – a contemplative and poetic wandering through ideas and insights regarding the phenomenology of these installations – but Risco Ruiz does argue persuasively for the position that ‘contemplative walking in light’ is both an appropriate aesthetic attitude towards these works and a transformative somaesthetic tool.

Although Risco Ruiz’s observations are compelling, it could be fruitful to explore alternative or competing views on how these works of light-art are, or ought to be, experienced. It is also not clear how far Risco Ruiz’s observations are intended to extend to other works of light-art or installation art. It would be beneficial to contrast the chosen examples with some that do not evoke the same somaesthetic experience despite
also utilising coloured light or the viewer's movement through space. This would more clearly demarcate the limitations of ‘contemplative walking in light’ and perhaps help to motivate the authors position regarding both the artistic intentions and the viewers' dispositions in the selected examples.

In further research, it would be intriguing to explore how and why the act of ‘contemplative walking in light’ as an aesthetic attitude has developed from previous artistic movements and assess the significance of its position in both contemporary art and the broader history of art. The emphasis on aesthetic experience and contemplative feeling contrasts with more intellectually focused works of the twentieth-century avant-garde; is it possible that the undeniable beauty and embodied experience that are associated with the light-works are a reaction to conceptual art? Such a somaesthetic form seems to break with the status-quo disposition of purely receptive looking and listening in relation to gallery-based artworks; it would be interesting to question how this compares to or has evolved from other interactive works of contemporary art.

Finally, in the interview conducted by Matija Rajter, Rafe McGregor addresses some of the issues raised by the narrative cognitivism that he develops in his book *Narrative Justice* (2018). On this view, as Rajter outlines in the introduction to the interview, “representations can provide knowledge in virtue of their narrativity, regardless of their potential truth value.” (2021, 68) McGregor uses these arguments to practical ends by, for instance, giving examples of how these ideas might be applied to undermine criminal inhumanity, or crimes motivated by ideology. Importantly, McGregor's is an interdisciplinary approach between philosophical aesthetics and criminology. As this interview makes clear, philosophical aesthetics has a lot to offer to other disciplines and vice versa. We hope to see more such approaches in future endeavours in the field.