

A photograph of two dancers in mid-air against a black background. The dancer on the left is wearing a light-colored shirt and trousers, with one leg extended forward. The dancer on the right is wearing a dark green shirt and trousers, with both arms raised high. The lighting is dramatic, highlighting the dancers' forms.

postgraduate journal of aesthetics

Volume 10, Issue 2
Summer 2013

BSA

BRITISH
SOCIETY OF
AESTHETICS

postgraduate journal of aesthetics

THE BRITISH SOCIETY OF AESTHETICS 2013

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The articles are set in The Brill, using the L^AT_EX typesetting system.

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about the journal

The aim of the *Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics* is to offer postgraduates interested in aesthetics a space to exchange ideas, and also to foster a resource that will promote high quality essays relevant to postgraduates' interests. The journal wishes to encourage a wide construal of the study of aesthetics to include papers from analytic, continental or historical points of view.

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Contents

editorial

Editors' note

Al Baker and Maarten Steenhagen 1

interview

The Pursuit of Fiction: An interview with Peter Lamarque

Helen Bradley 2

articles

Guyer's Interpretation of Free Harmony in Kant

Mojca Kuplen 17

Defining Satire

Daniel Abrahams 33

Scoring Dance

Hetty Blades 43

EDITORS' NOTE

In this summer issue we publish three outstanding articles, submissions that jointly signal the diversity and resourcefulness of current research in the field. Hetty Blades brings in 'Scoring Dance' to light that notation in dance—producing “scores”—is more than just a useful tool for preservation and metaphysical book-keeping; notation can actually become an integral part of the work of dance itself. In the article 'Defining Satire,' Daniel Abrahams asks what it is to satirise someone or some thing. Developing Gregory Currie's theory of interpretation and Berys Gaut's work on amusement, Abrahams comes up with a definition that places criticism and misrepresentation at the core of the satirical device. And far from satirical, Mojca Kuplen offers a critical evaluation of Paul Guyer's reading of Immanuel Kant's *Third Critique*. In 'Guyer's Interpretation of Free Harmony in Kant,' Kuplen develops four objections to Guyer's suggestion that we should understand the idea of a 'free play' of the faculties along metacognitive lines.

We proudly continue our series of interviews with an insight into the intellectual biography of professor Peter Lamarque from the University of York. Helen Bradley has questioned him, and probed his long-standing history with the work of Quine, his collaborations with Stein Olsen, and his crusade for the autonomous value of art—a quest that up to today seduces some to voice that haunting complaint, the charge of being a 'formalist.'

Al Baker

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THE PURSUIT OF FICTION

An Interview with Peter Lamarque

Helen Bradley

University of York

1 Work & object

HELEN BRADLEY: Peter, it's very difficult to know where to start with a career as illustrious as yours so perhaps the best way to begin is by asking about your most recent book *Work and Object*,¹ for which you won the 'Outstanding Monograph Prize' from the ASA in 2010. Congratulations!

PETER LAMARQUE: Thank you very much!

HB: As you say in the introduction, the book explores the idea of work. Could you tell us a little about what got you thinking about this topic?

PL: Okay, let's start with the title. 'Work and Object' obviously alludes to Quine's famous book *Word and Object*, and that's no coincidence. I wrote my BPhil thesis at Oxford on Quine—in fact on Quine's theory of ontological commitment—and this is a book on ontology. The second book I published was also a collection of essays, called *Fictional Points of View*,² which again has an echo of Quine and his book

¹Lamarque 2010.

²Lamarque 1996.

From a Logical Point of View. In fact I was going to call the book ‘From a Fictional Point of View’ [laughing]. So we’ve got that Quine resonance with the new book too even though it’s not really about Quine at all. But it is about ontology! *Work and Object* is a collection of some of my papers, and it started with a paper of the same name, which I gave to the Aristotelian Society in 2002.³ That paper was me breaking away from writing on fiction and literature, which of course I have been pursuing for some time. I was, to some extent, going into new territory with the ontology of art. What I did in that first paper was look at the distinction between work and object.

HB: Could you tell us a bit about this distinction?

PL: Very briefly the idea is that for every work of art there is a constituting object, which, at least partially, makes it the work it is, but which is not identical with the work. That’s my view, and it is by no means original—other people have come up with it before. So, as an example, take a painting: there is an object, namely the canvas, the pigment, the colour, and so on. Now, my claim is that that object is not identical to the work. Obviously it’s necessary to the work, but it’s not identical to it. The work is something different. Lots of metaphysicians have talked about sculpture—and I do as well—because they take it as paradigmatic of this distinction. So the question is: is the statue identical to the piece of bronze or the piece of marble of which it is made? Many people take different views on this but my view is that it is not. We’ve in effect got two objects here; we’ve got the physical object which is the bronze or the marble, and the work, which is a different kind of object—it’s a cultural object, it’s got different kinds of properties. Although, of course, they are embodied in the same material form, they aren’t actually the same.

HB: So is the thought that ‘works’ and ‘objects’ call for different kinds of descriptions?

³Lamarque 2002.

PL: Absolutely. They call for different kinds of descriptions picking out different kinds of properties. And some of the properties that interested me about works rather than objects are intentional properties and relational properties. So a work, for example, has a meaning, or a point, whereas an object probably doesn't have that. The distinction also relates to the responses that people have to a work, and I have the view, which I develop through the book and especially in that first paper, that without the possibility of people responding in an appropriate way to the work the work doesn't exist. So a work as a cultural object is embedded in a cultural world such that if that world changed radically, then the work would cease to exist, even though the physical object—the paint, the marble, the bronze—would go on existing. The idea of a distinction between just a 'thing' with its purely physical properties, and works, with their work-related properties, is essential if we are to get a good grip on understanding what art is.

HB: So thinking about this distinction between work and object, I'm interested to hear about the case of literature, especially as you've spent much time discussing it in your other work. What, in your view, is the 'object' that we contrast the 'work' of literature with? Is it just bare sounds or marks on a page?

PL: Well the basic distinction is between what I call a 'text' and a 'work'. A text is just made up of words and sentences. It's not quite the same, of course, as the bronze of the statue or the paint of the painting. Even so, a text is still, in a very loose sense, a kind of object, distinct from the work that is related to it very closely but again not identical to it. A text will have purely linguistic properties but a work will have meaning of a very specific kind and, in the end, it will have cultural properties, like being in a genre or being part of a tradition. Now a literary work, for example, holds more than just the meaning of its constitutive sentences. Those meanings could be given through a dictionary or through the resources of a language. In a literary work there are bigger meanings, themes that are being developed. So when you approach a text as a literary work, you're on the lookout for these

other kinds of properties—the intentional and relational properties ‘kick in’ in virtue of it’s being a work. And then you are responding to it as a work of literature, and not just as a text.

HB: I notice that your, by now familiar, conception of practice crops up in your discussion of what constraints we might apply to the theory of a work. Could you tell us a bit more about that conception more generally and the role it plays in your theory?

PL: That was a very important notion in my earlier book, *Truth, Fiction and Literature*, which I wrote with Stein Haugom Olsen.⁴ But it’s not that I’ve lost that concept—I still think it’s absolutely central to all the arts. The idea of a practice goes back to Wittgenstein and the idea of a language game, or a game associated with particular kinds of discourses. I think the idea is very useful and very powerful, because it connects with the idea of rules. For a practice there are certain rules, which are both constitutive and regulative of the practice. So there are some rules that actually define the practice. For example, there are constitutive rules of fiction such that the very possibility of fiction depends on them. Only if those rules are in place can anything count as a work of fiction.

You’re quite right that the idea of a practice comes up in all of my work, so it connects to many of the themes I discuss in *Work and Object*. There it’s an idea of works being embedded in cultural practices, and there are practices associated, for example, with making and looking at paintings, or with making and reading poems, or with making music and responding to music. Those practices are related but very different, and there are different sorts of rules for each. Interestingly there’s also a kind of overarching practice, the art practice, which they all fall into. So there are commonalities across all the arts that can be explained in terms of what being a work of art is, and I think again the idea of a practice is illuminating here—in the idea of rules governing what it is to produce a work, what it is to respond to it as a work, how different kinds of works relate to each other, and how one practice re-

⁴Lamarque and Olsen 1994.

lates to other practices. Part of the job of the philosopher is to identify what these rules are—that's one of the key aims in exploring aesthetics. In this book *Work and Object* I am looking at the rules that govern these practices.

2 Truth, fiction, and value

HB: You've already mentioned the book you wrote with Stein Olsen, *Truth, Fiction, and Literature*. Could you tell us a bit more about how that partnership came about?

PL: Well there's an amusing story. I reviewed Stein Olsen's first book, *The Structure of Literary Understanding*,⁵ soon after it came out in 1978, and actually I had never heard of him! [laughing] The review was for *The Philosophical Review*, and I said what a brilliant book I thought it was.⁶ The only thing I disagreed with, somewhat to my amusement now, is his chapter on truth and literature. Because in those days I thought that literature had a close connection with truth and with knowledge, and that it was a way of expanding our understanding of the world and of ourselves, and so on. Stein, in his book, had been sceptical of that, and so I said 'well, I have some reservations on that point.' I think after that, if I remember correctly, he wrote to me thanking me for the review. We stayed in touch and we corresponded for a while. I was in Scotland at the time and he came over from Norway with his family, partly to work with me and partly, you know, for something to do! So he and I got to know each other very well. I was teaching then, a course on literature, and he would come and sit in and contribute.

So that was the beginning of a friendship and an intellectual partnership. We realized the stuff he was doing on literature and some of the stuff I was doing on fiction were connected, so we came up with the idea of writing a book together, on fiction and literature. The idea was that I would write the parts on fiction and he would write the parts on

⁵Olsen 1978.

⁶Lamarque 1979.

literature. But of course he was for the most part in a different country, and this was before the days of email. So it was much more difficult to communicate! But gradually the book took shape and it took shape round the point I was making earlier about the idea of a practice. In his earlier book *The Structure of Literary Understanding*, Stein developed an idea of practice, but he called it an 'institution.' This was the idea that there is an institution of literature, and in order to understand what literary works are you have to understand that institution. Although I was unsure about whether this could illuminate the case of fiction, I started to think that it might. So I was very much influenced by Stein. I hope that, in the end, it gelled together!

HB: It's very interesting to hear you say that originally you were quite impressed by the idea of literature and its connection to truth and its teaching function. But along came Stein Olsen and he changed your mind, and you end up developing a 'no-truth' conception of literary value. How did he draw you over to his way of thinking?

PL: Actually the difference was not all that great between my thinking that literature could contribute in some way to a self-understanding of human beings, and so on, and the view that we develop in the book. It might seem a narrow point, especially now I look back. What we're saying is that neither the notion of truth or the notion of knowledge are the key to understanding the value of literature. That doesn't mean to say, of course, that literary works don't engage humanly interesting themes: the big themes that occupy human beings and have always done so. Themes of life and love, despair, hope and duty, and so on; of course, the great works of literature explore, and I use that word advisedly, these themes in original, powerful, and engaging ways. It's obviously important to see that one value of literature is that it should do that.

What I learned from Stein is that literary works explore the big human themes in their own way, in the sense that they're not competing with philosophy. The way that philosophy tackles those big themes is largely through developing theories, which they put forward as true,

defensible, and reasoned. Philosophy is to do with reason and argument and truth, but literary works such as novels, plays, and poems are not in the business of producing theories. They are exploring these big ideas but in a different way. That had come out in Stein's original book and maybe I misread him as saying that literature had nothing to do with exploring these big ideas — but in fact he wasn't saying that at all. So I hope what comes across in *Truth, Fiction and Literature* is that literature has huge value in the realm of ideas and human self-understanding, and so on. In any narrow sense of truth, however, and by 'narrow' I mean the philosophical sense of truth, it's not an aspiration of literature to give us truth in the way that a scientific theory or a philosophical theory aims at truth.

HB: With all these different kinds of truths and uses of the predicates 'true' and 'false,' it seems very difficult to pin down exactly how the term is being used by the 'pro-truth' camps, concerning literary value. Do you think when these theorists talk of 'truth' they really mean something quite different? If so, is it something you and Olsen would necessarily disregard as integral to literary value?

PL: Well actually, when you look at the way that literary people talk about truth it does often turn out to be something quite different from the philosophical notion of truth. Philosophical truth is largely propositional truth; it's a proposition that sets itself up as either true or false, and one that can be defended or argued for. However, most defenders of literary truth, even philosophical defenders, say that that's not really what they mean by truth. What they mean is something like 'sincerity' or 'authenticity,' or 'truthfulness.' They don't mean truth in this narrow philosophical or scientific sense. At this point the whole debate changes, because Stein and I can just say 'well, we're not really talking about the same thing.' When we say literature is not principally to do with truth, we're talking about philosophical or scientific truth—but you're not. You're talking about a different kind of truth, and perhaps if we talk about truth in your sense, using notions like 'sincerity' and 'authenticity,' we can agree with you that they are indeed literary val-

ues. Though I think it's misleading to call that 'truth'. Partly because as a philosopher I come from a tradition of talking about truth where it doesn't mean 'sincerity,' and so on.

The main point I take issue with, and actually many philosophers have said this about literature, is that somehow a work of literature is only of value if it's good for you in some way—notably if you learn something. It goes back to Plato's demand that the arts justify themselves as useful in some way. That tradition has gone on, in a variety of ways, to defend literature in terms of what it can teach us.

HB: That tradition is very interesting. Cognitivism about literary value has many supporters and has developed into many strands, which harks back to that olive branch that Plato offered the arts.

PL: Yes, 'show it's useful and we'll let you back into the Republic'!

HB: But do you still disagree with those who say that literary value has less to do with truth and more to do with an education of sorts, perhaps an emotional or a moral education?

PL: It's important to get the dialectic right here because what I'm not denying, and I take it Olsen is not denying either, is that you can learn something from literature. Of course you can—you can learn things of many different kinds. You can learn lots of practical things from reading literature, you could learn about geography or etiquette, and of course you can learn about fictional characters. That can be important actually, because some fictional characters like Oedipus or Hamlet are utterly iconic; they are part of what defines our culture, they kind of embody it. If people are going to understand Western culture, or even certain human ideas, it's very important that they know something about these iconic fictional characters. So I'm not saying that you can't learn from literature. What I resist is only the claim that all literary value is invested in this learning outcome, particularly when it's expressed in terms of truth. That is the claim that literature is only valuable to the extent that it tells us something true about human be-

ings and thereby contributes to our understanding of human beings. I don't think that's the way to look at literature. Yes we can learn things, and we can learn things about ourselves, and some of what we learn about ourselves could be expressed in propositions that have truth-value. So the dialectic is difficult since I'm not dismissing the idea that some true propositions could be acquired from or can arise out of reading literature. I just don't think that's the principal value of literature.

HB: And is this idea still something you want to defend? Or have your views about cognitivism changed over the years?

PL: You mention an emotional education and that's an interesting case. Jenefer Robinson puts a lot of store on emotion, and you get the same in Martha Nussbaum and Susan Feagin.⁷ That has slightly shifted the terms of the debate about cognitivism because it is no longer focusing on truth and knowledge. It's focusing on the emotional experiences we have when we engage with literary works and the value attributed to that emotional experience. I am not denying that literature can give us a heightened emotional experience—it's what tragedy does, or sentimental literature—and we value them for that reason. But this is where I disagree with these thinkers: I don't think that that is what makes great literature great. I don't think that inducing a heightened emotional experience is the mark of great literature, although I do think that a work's ability to express emotion is sometimes important.

HB: You've been emphatic about what isn't the mark of great literature, but that raises the question of what, in your view, is great literature. What makes great literature great?

PL: Well, here I'm sort of flying a kite in a way. I suppose I have a view that really great works of art somehow transcend individual differences, cultural differences, and even temporal differences. We could

⁷Robinson 2005; Nussbaum 2003; Nussbaum 1992; Feagin 1996.

be reading them now or they could have been written 2,000 years ago, but somehow great works of literature speak to our human nature rather than just to our narrower cultural and individual natures, which of course are real and important. Still somehow, and this is the aspiration, great works transcend cultural differences. Hume believed something like this. The values we have been talking about so far, such as truth, knowledge, or a teaching function, are sometimes called instrumental values in art. This is the idea that art's value is explicable in terms of its consequences or what it brings about. So there has been an interesting shift from truth to, say, emotion. As I say, I don't deny that these consequences exist or that they are valuable, but I don't think they are at the heart of what makes the arts valuable. I did, perhaps rather provocatively I suppose, publish a paper entitled 'The Uselessness of Art.' The idea owes its origin to Oscar Wilde, who said that all art is quite useless, and I thought 'there's something in that!' In a way it kind of epitomizes my reaction to the claim that art is only good if it's useful, particularly if it's useful in teaching us something or stirs our emotions. What I wanted to pursue there, and is related really to everything that we've been talking about, is the thought that art has a kind of value in itself—an autonomous value—that is not reducible to any of these other instrumental values—political values, or cognitive values, and so on. That art has value for itself. And of course people say 'well that's just art for art's sake' and that view was totally discredited, and is connected with a crude kind of formalism. So I do need to defend my view against that charge. I don't think I'm a formalist, nor am I saying art is valuable just in virtue of its form, whatever that might mean.

HB: You gave the keynote paper at the Understanding Value conference at Sheffield in 2012, which was entitled 'On Not Being Too Formalistic About Literary Value' so it seems that this charge of formalism is something you're keen to address.

PL: Well that was developing, in a way, the uselessness point. I wanted to show that you can defend art for art's sake without defend-

ing or being committed to formalism. I think that's right because I think pure formalism, which sometimes says that all that matters in a work is its form, is a non-starter. However I think you can hold this non-instrumental uselessness view without that commitment, and retain the idea of art for art's sake without formalism.

3 The future of aesthetics

HB: From your work it's clear that you think reading literature demands a different kind of attention from the way in which we read, say, philosophy. You seem to take literary criticism very seriously as a source for insights and intuitions about how novels should be read. Do you think more aestheticians should follow your lead?

PL: Well one always hopes that! I think that if you've got a set of ideas that you think are right then you always hope that other people will follow. For what it's worth I don't want to associate myself with the New Critics because I think they had too much of a hermetically-sealed vision of the literary work as a verbal icon, completely free-standing and cut off from its origins and other connections. But do I think people should take my line? Of course! My highest aspiration, intellectually speaking, and as someone writing about literature, is that literary people would read my stuff and come to share my views. Actually until very recently we've had literary theorists in their department, doing their own thing, and us literary aesthetics people in philosophy departments, doing our thing, and there's *no* connection. To some extent we read their work, but they think we just parody what they do and we don't really understand it—so they don't read our work at all. That's very disillusioning for someone like me who is interested in literature, and of course interested in literary criticism.

But thankfully I think that's breaking down now. I'm very happy to say I have a lot of correspondence with people in literature departments these days. People who have perhaps read my work and got in touch. And of course, people like to find out that their work is being read. Don't be afraid to write to people and express an interest in

their work. So I think my and other people's work on literary aesthetics is getting out into the literary community. I was pleased to see, although it was a double-edged pleasure, that Terry Eagleton engages substantially with both Stein Olsen and me in his recent book.⁸ He of course has criticisms but here's a very well-known literary theorist who has never before engaged with or taken seriously what analytic philosophers have to say, writing a whole book that is largely focused on the themes in my book *The Philosophy of Literature* and the book with Olsen. Anyway that's very heartening and I hope it will continue to happen. I've got a certain level of readership in the philosophy community and in the aesthetics community but I've got a *very* small readership in the literary community. But I hope that it's growing.

HB: In your most recent work you turn your attention to the metaphysics and ontology of artworks. Do you think that by answering metaphysical questions regarding artworks, aesthetics has a significant contribution to make towards metaphysics more generally, and perhaps to other areas of philosophy?

PL: I hope so and yes, I think so. One interesting case in point is Julian Dodd, who has written a very good book on the ontology of music. But he came to that from having no interest in aesthetics at all. I like to think that I had something to do with it because I gave a paper at his university very many years ago on the ontology of art, which struck a chord with him. We corresponded and he started writing on the topic, and indeed I published one or two papers of his in the *British Journal of Aesthetics* (BJA). Then he developed his ideas in the book, and now he's a key figure in aesthetics. So here is someone who has moved from metaphysics, is still doing metaphysics, but now doing aesthetics as well. That's good because it exemplifies this two-way process. Aesthetics is learning from and being influenced by metaphysics from the outside, but people in metaphysics are looking at the work that's being done, for example on music, and that's helping to shape what's going on in metaphysics. So it's a two-way interaction. But there is a

⁸Eagleton 2012.

danger in all these sorts of borrowings from other areas that you lose sight of what's distinctive about art, so one must be careful. However, it can be, and has been, very fruitful in many ways.

HB: You spent many years as the editor of the BJA. Could you offer any advice to early career aestheticians hoping to get published?

PL: Well, I really hope postgraduates send work to the BJA and get it published—because it's a very good journal, along with others, and it's a great launch-pad for a career. The truth is that if young people and people starting out in philosophy were not publishing in journals like the BJA, such journals would just disappear. It's kept going and gets its life from new people coming in and saying new things and pushing it forward. When I was the editor I was conscious of the fact that, although it's always nice to get papers from well-known people, you can't only have that kind of work in the journal. You've got to get new people. They have to start somewhere and it's the responsibility of an editor to give them opportunities. That doesn't mean lowering standards, because the standard of postgraduate students in aesthetics is high across the board. And I know that the current editor, John Hyman, is aware of this idea and is sensitive to it. Besides, if we did just publish well-known authors the journal would become very stale, because these people often (and I know this is true in my own case) stick to the same lines of argument. What they're doing is just recycling what they've said before and a journal can't live off that. A journal has to keep at the cutting edge and has to keep pushing things forward. That's got to come from younger people. The rest of us just want to know what's going on, and what they're thinking. So of course send work to the BJA, and it will certainly be looked at sympathetically and attentively.

Maybe I'm speaking to all postgraduates here, but along with trying to get published you should also get yourself known as someone working in a particular field. Go to conferences, offer papers, don't be afraid of writing to people who have published something that interests you and follow up some points with them—then respond to them.

The job climate is tough now, but it always has been. But people *are* getting jobs in aesthetics, so there is no need to despair. Another piece of general advice is to try not to be too narrowly focused, really sell yourself to an employer by showing that you know about or can teach other things. You don't want to give the impression that all you know anything about is some narrow area in aesthetics. Of course writing a PhD is 'narrowness' exemplified, but try to keep your interests broad. Find out what's going on and keep up with what's happening in other fields so you can say sincerely in an interview that you have other interests. It's tough writing a PhD and it's tough looking for a job. But the jobs are there and my goodness the talent is there—I do know that.

ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEE: Since 2000, Peter Lamarque has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of York. Before that, he was Ferens Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Department at the University of Hull (1995-2000), and taught in the Philosophy Department of the University of Stirling, first as Lecturer (1972-1993) and then as Senior Lecturer (1993-95). He has held visiting positions at the Institute of Philosophy, University of Tsukuba, Japan (1983-84), Cornell University as Visiting Associate Professor (1985, 1987, 1993), the Humanities Research Centre, Australian National University as Visiting Fellow (1994), and the Programme of the Theory of Literature, University of Lisbon, as Visiting Professor (2009).

ABOUT THE INTERVIEWER: Helen Bradley is a doctoral candidate at the University of York. She has a BA in Philosophy from the University of Reading, and an MA Philosophy of Art and Literature from York.

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GUYER'S INTERPRETATION OF FREE HARMONY IN KANT

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Kant's task in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* was to give an account of how genuine judgments of taste, that is, judgments about the beautiful (and the ugly), are possible.¹ His objective was to resolve an apparent contradiction between two characteristics pertaining to judgments of taste, that is, its subjectivity and universality. However, some interpreters have pointed out that Kant's resolution seems to be incompatible with his own epistemological views. Accordingly, Paul Guyer has recently defended a 'metacognitive' reading of Kant's claims. My aim in this paper is to examine and reevaluate Guyer's interpretative suggestion, and to point out the main difficulties with his approach. I will argue that his reading does not offer a full and satisfactory account of Kant's aesthetics, because it cannot accommodate three of Kant's core commitments.

1 Perception of the Beautiful

Which apparently contradictory ideas motivated Kant in his third *Critique*? The first idea is that judgments of taste are subjective, that is,

¹Kant defines taste as "... the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction *without any interest*. The object of such a satisfaction is called *beautiful*" (§5, 5:211. Emphasis added). Citations not otherwise identified refer to Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (2000). Citations to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1996) utilize the customary first (A) and second (B) edition format.

their determining ground can be nothing else but the subject's experience of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. That one aesthetically likes (or dislikes) an object must necessarily result from one's feeling of being delighted or pleased (or displeased) by that object, which cannot be imputed to someone by means of rational consideration. Beauty and ugliness are not objective properties of things in themselves, but merely represent the way in which we respond to objects. Kant claims accordingly that judgments of taste are not based on a concept of the object. Rather, judgments of taste are contrasted with cognitive judgments. Whereas the truth or falsity of cognitive judgments, such as 'x is a chair,' can be proven by rational consideration, and the judgment 'this x is a chair' is true if it satisfies the necessary conditions for the application of the concept of a chair, no such truth verification is possible in the case of judgments of taste. A judgment of taste is non-conceptual, Kant claims, which means that it is not determined by a concept of the object, but merely by a feeling: "If one judges objects merely in accordance with concepts, then all representation of beauty is lost. Thus there can also be no rule in accordance with which someone could be compelled to acknowledge something as beautiful" (§8, 5:216). Whether an object is beautiful is not discerned by whether it satisfies the properties of a concept. That is, a given object may be a perfect example of the kind it belongs to, yet still be ugly. If judgments of taste depend solely on the feeling of pleasure (or displeasure), and because feelings are not corrigible—that is, one cannot be wrong about one's own feelings—then judgments of taste have merely subjective validity.

Yet while Kant observes that judgments of taste are grounded in the subjective feeling of pleasure (or displeasure), he also acknowledges that they have some form of universal validity. We argue about matters of taste, which suggests that judgments of taste contain an implicit demand that others ought to agree with us and that some universal agreement can be established. Yet the validity of judgments of taste cannot be objective (as in cognitive judgments), since beauty is not a property of objects. Beauty resides in the subject's feeling of pleasure, and so the validity of judgments of taste is a 'subjective universal' va-

lidity. The universal validity of judgments of taste is grounded in the universal validity of a subject's feeling of pleasure:

. . . universality that does not rest on concepts of objects (even if only empirical ones) is not logical at all, but aesthetic, i.e., it does not contain an objective quantity of judgment, but only a subjective one, for which I also use the expression common validity, which does not designate the validity for every subject of the relation of a representation to the faculty of cognition but rather to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. (§8, 5:214)

A reconciliation of these seemingly incompatible characteristics of judgments of taste, that is, of subjectivity and universality, is the main objective of Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. He asks,

How is a judgment possible which, merely from one's own feeling of pleasure in an object, independent of its concept, judges this pleasure, as attached to the representation of the same object in every other subject, *a priori*, i.e., without having to wait for the assent of others? (§36, 5:288)

Kant finds the solution in a concept of harmony of the cognitive faculties in their free play. His argument can be roughly summarized in the following way: the universal validity of pleasure can be justified by claiming that the feeling of pleasure depends on a state of mind that we all share. But what we all share is a state of mind in which there is harmony between imagination and understanding. Kant claims that cognition is necessitated by the mental activities of imagination, whose function is to synthesize the manifold of intuition, and by the understanding, which unifies this manifold under the concept of the object. This harmony between the imagination and understanding is required for cognition, and is universally communicable, because without it "human beings could not communicate their representations and even cognition itself" (§38, 5:290). Pleasure in judgments of taste is based on such a harmonious relation of cognitive powers, and it must therefore be universally communicable.

On the other hand, Kant claims that the perception of the beautiful is different from cognition. He draws a distinction by claiming that in judgments of taste the harmonious relation of cognitive powers is in free play because “no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition” (§9, 5:217). This relation is *merely* subjective, Kant claims, since it refers only to the mutual relation between cognitive powers in the subject, without any relation to the object. Accordingly, while the relation between cognitive powers in cognitive judgments is not merely subjective but ends in the application of the concept to the object and therefore in a cognitive judgment, the relation between cognitive powers in judgments of taste is merely subjective (it does not apply concepts) and results in a feeling of pleasure alone.

2 Interpretations of Kant's solution

Contemporary scholars have major difficulties with Kant's argument. In particular, as Paul Guyer has pointed out, Kant's conception of free harmony is incompatible with his epistemological theory. Kant explains in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that concepts are not merely applied to the synthesis of imagination, but they *determine* the process of that synthesis. A concept, Kant says, is a rule for the synthesis of the manifold (A106). The imagination combines sense impressions and produces a perceptual image according to the concept. Imagination and understanding must be in harmony in order to present an object of perceptual experience, and this harmony is governed by concepts. Furthermore, Kant seems to claim that it is not only pure concepts (categories) that govern the synthesis of the manifold, but empirical concepts as well. The reasoning is the following:

- (1) Categories (such as substance, cause and effect etc.) are rules that govern the synthetic unity of all appearances, that is, they are conditions for the possibility of all experience (A128).
- (2) Categories do not have their own images: “Pure concepts of understanding, on the other hand, are quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions (indeed, from sensible intuitions generally)

and can never be encountered in any intuition” (A137/B176). That is, there is no image of a category of substance or an image of the category of cause and effect. All the images and laws we encounter in the empirical world are merely particular determinations of the categories (A128). For example, an image of a house is only a particular determination of the category of a substance, and the law that ‘the sun is the cause of the warmth of the stone’ is a particular determination of the category of cause and effect.

- (3) But if categories must be applied to the sensible manifold (in order to have perceptual experience), and if categories do not distinguish between particular images and laws, this means that in order to have an experience of a particular image, my sense impressions must be guided, not only by the categories, but by particular empirical concepts as well. That is, in order to have an image, say of a dog, the manifold of sense impressions must be guided not only by the category of a substance, but by the empirical concept of a dog as well. Accordingly, in order for categories to function as rules for the synthesis of any manifold of sensible impressions, they require the assistance of empirical concepts. Empirical concepts are necessary for the experience of objects, because only through them can the categories, required for the unity of consciousness, be applied to the sensible manifold.
- (4) But this in turn means that the apprehension of the form in aesthetic perception is not guided solely by the categories, but is also guided by the application of empirical concepts.²

Accordingly, we are presented with a difficulty. How can we understand the concept of free play, constitutive of judgments of taste, if such a play is not constituted by the complete absence of empirical concepts? A variety of interpretations of the concept of free play have emerged in order to reconcile the following contradictory theses that Kant seems to hold:

²This view has also been defended by Ginsborg (1997, p. 56).

- (i) Judgments of taste do not depend on the (empirical) concept of the object, but on the *mere* form of the object, or on presentation through the free play of imagination and understanding.
- (ii) Judgments of taste have the perception of the form of the object as their subject.
- (iii) The perception of the form of the object depends on an (empirical) concept.

Guyer classifies these interpretations into three main classes: pre-cognitive, multicognitive, and metacognitive interpretations. The last one is argued for by Guyer.³ In a nutshell, the main strategy of the pre-cognitive approach is to hold premises (i) and (ii), but deny premise (iii). It claims that the imagination has the ability to combine sense impressions and to produce a perceptual image without being governed by empirical concepts. Accordingly, free harmony is achieved prior (temporally) to the actual conceptualization of the intuition.⁴ A multicognitive approach instead holds premises (ii) and (iii), with a revision of (i). It claims that the free play of cognitive powers is attained by the application of a multiplicity of concepts. A judgment of taste is similar to an ordinary cognitive judgment, because it employs concepts, but while cognitive judgments subsume the manifold under one concept, judgments of taste do not apply a definite concept but rather play with a multitude of them, offering therefore a variety of different perceptions of a form.⁵ The metacognitive approach holds

³Guyer 2005, p. 147.

⁴The most advanced and established version of this approach has been given by Hannah Ginsborg. Ginsborg claims that the synthesis of sense impressions, by which we come to form a perceptual image, is not guided by empirical concepts, but is rather a natural process of combining sense impressions into forms and patterns. This process, she writes, has an inherent awareness of the appropriateness of the synthesis. Ginsborg calls such awareness a 'perceptual normativity,' and states that it is required for both empirical concept formation and judgments of taste. Perceptual normativity or free harmony is universally communicable, because it carries its own normativity, that is, there is an implicit awareness that one way of perceiving of an object is appropriate, and that everyone else ought to perceive that object in the same way. But this means that pleasure in judgments of the beautiful, resulting from free harmony, is universally communicable (Ginsborg 1997, p. 65).

⁵See Crowther (2010) and Rush (2001) for their version of the multicognitive approach.

premises (ii) and (iii), yet denies (i). It holds that aesthetic perception is dependent on empirical concepts. The difficulties with the first two approaches have already been tackled by Guyer, and as such my aim in what follows is to point out the main problems with Guyer's metacognitive approach.⁶

3 Guyer's metacognitive interpretation

According to Guyer, free harmony is constituted by conceptual synthesis exercised to a high degree. In order to experience free harmony we must first experience cognitive harmony, which is responsible for the ordinary perceptual experience of an object. While all objects have cognitive harmony in order to be represented to us, not all of them have free harmony. Free harmony is a cognitive harmony exercised to a high degree, that is, a harmony that exhibits order or unity that extends beyond the unity necessary for the recognition of an object "as it were, an excess of felt unity or harmony," or a "further degree of unity."⁷ Guyer describes free harmony in the following way:

free and harmonious play of imagination and understanding should be understood as a state of mind in which the manifold of intuition induced by the perception of an object and presented by the imagination to the understand-

⁶In short, Guyer's main objection against the precognitive and multicognitive approach is their inconsistency with Kant's epistemological theory. That is, they do not take into account that, according to Kant's theory of knowledge, the application of empirical concepts to the manifold of intuition is required for the experience of the object in the first place. Accordingly, there cannot be a harmony between cognitive powers devoid of any determinate conceptual applicability (Guyer 2006, p. 180-181). Furthermore, he points out that the most obvious difficulty for the precognitive approach is that it leads to the 'everything is beautiful' problem. Namely, if free harmony is constituted by the satisfaction of the same conditions that are required for ordinary cognition (yet, without the application of the concept), then it follows that every object of cognition must be in principle beautiful (ibid., p. 172). On the other hand, he writes that the main difficulty with the multicognitive approach, in addition to being the approach least supported by Kant's text, is that this interpretation does not explain the connection between perceptual shifting and pleasure. That is, this interpretation does not explain why a play between the manifold and the multitude of concepts (shifting back and forth from one concept to another and not settling down to any of them) should be pleasurable, rather than confusing and irritating (ibid., p. 177).

⁷Guyer 2005, p. 149-150.

ing is recognized to satisfy the rules for the organization of that manifold dictated by the determinate concept or concepts on which our recognition and identification of the object of this experience depends. It is also a state of mind in which it is felt that—or as if—the understanding's underlying objective or interest in unity is being satisfied in a way that *goes beyond* anything required for or dictated by satisfaction of the determinate concept or concepts on which mere identification of the object depends.⁸

Accordingly, in order for an object to induce aesthetic pleasure, first the necessary conditions of cognition must be satisfied. That is, we must recognize the object under some specific concept. Free harmony is produced only if this cognitive harmony, by which identification of an object takes place, exhibits an extra amount of unity, exceeding the basic unity that is required for ordinary cognition.

Guyer's approach reconciles Kant's theory of concepts as rules necessary for perceptual experience and his theory of free harmony necessary for judgments of the beautiful. Even though perception is governed by concepts, and to this extent it is not free, it can still attain freedom by exhibiting unity to a high degree. Accordingly, not all objects are beautiful, only those that have this high degree of unity. This explains why only some objects belonging to a given kind (determined by a given concept) are beautiful, while others are not. For example, this chair is beautiful, but not the other, even though they apply the same concept. Nonetheless, Guyer's approach is not fully satisfactory. Let me point out four main difficulties that his interpretation faces.

3.1 Perfection

I want to argue that Guyer's explanation of free harmony as a further degree of cognitive harmony is not convincing in light of Kant's views about perfection. My reasoning is the following: according to Kant's theory of perception, cognitive agreement between imagination and understanding is necessary for the recognition of an object to take

⁸Guyer 2006, p. 182-183.

place. For example, my recognition of an object as a tree depends on recognizing the common properties that all trees have in common (they all have properties such as leaves, branches, and trunks as specified by the concept of a tree). Kant writes that this agreement between cognitive powers can be exercised in different degrees or proportions (§21).

Henry Allison gives a fine explanation as to what these degrees of cognitive powers in perceptual experience amount to.⁹ Allison claims that because imagination and understanding are characterized by different objectives, one by particularity and the other by universality respectively, they pull in different directions, and therefore friction between them often occurs. This happens, he writes, when the apprehension of the manifold is atypical and therefore subsumption under the concept is more difficult to obtain. For example, it is more difficult to recognize an image of a three-legged dog as a dog than an image of a dog that satisfies all the prototypical features of a dog. This is an example of perceptual experience with a low or minimal degree of agreement between cognitive powers. On the other hand, an image of a dog that satisfies all of the prototypical properties of a dog is an experience of cognitive powers being in a higher degree of agreement. The object is immediately recognized as a dog. Accordingly, a low or high degree of cognitive harmony amounts to the level of difficulty of perceptual recognition of an object. An image of a three-legged dog is more difficult to recognize than the image of a four-legged dog.

But Guyer claims that a high degree of cognitive harmony is the kind of free harmony that produces an experience of pleasure. If this is true, then it follows that every object which represents a perfect instance of the kind it belongs to must be experienced with pleasure. But this seems wrong. I may recognize with ease an image that exemplifies all the essential conditions of, say, a turkey, or an equally perfect instance of a dog, but it is not true that I find them necessarily beautiful. On the contrary, even the perfect instance of a turkey is displeasing. Hence, despite the fact that there is a high cognitive harmony between the imagination and understanding in these cases,

⁹Allison 2001, p. 48-50.

there is no pleasure.

The opposite is also the case. There are objects that are more difficult to recognize under the concept, and therefore have a low degree of cognitive harmony, yet they are pleasing. For example, identifying a flower called *Rafflesia* as a flower is more difficult, since it does not have stems or leaves and therefore it does not satisfy all of the prototypical conditions of the concept of a flower. Yet it still has a pleasing appearance. This idea is in fact explicitly acknowledged by Kant in §15, where he distinguishes between two different kinds of judgments: judgments of taste and judgments of qualitative perfection. Kant claims that even though judgments of qualitative perfection may be accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, as when we see an object that exemplifies all the essential features of the kind to which it belongs, this is not, however, the pleasure of the beautiful. Judgments of qualitative perfection are kinds of cognitive judgments, because they depend on the concept of the object; while judgments of taste are aesthetic judgments, depending on the feeling of pleasure (or displeasure) alone. Kant tells us that

the judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, i.e., one that rests on subjective grounds, and its determining ground cannot be a concept, and thus not a concept of a determinate end. Thus by beauty, as a formal subjective purposiveness, there is not conceived any perfection of the object. (§15, 5:228)

Accordingly, this means that perceiving an object as a perfect instance of the kind to which it belongs does not mean that we find it beautiful, and finding an object beautiful does not suggest that this object is a perfect instance of its kind. One can find certain forms of flower beautiful, even if they are flawed examples of flowers. Or, one can find certain flowers displeasing, even though they represent a perfect example of the flower. Therefore, high cognitive harmony cannot simply be identified with free harmony and with beauty, as Guyer claims.

3.2 Kind-specific beauty

Guyer's explanation of free harmony cannot explain the possibility that there are multiple objects belonging to the same kind and that each example of this kind could be pleasing. That is, Guyer's account requires that beautiful objects have certain properties that distinguish them from aesthetically indifferent members of their kind. Guyer claims that an object is beautiful if it exceeds the minimal unity required for the recognition of the object as a member of its kind. Accordingly, a rose is beautiful if it has more unity than is needed for an ordinary experience of a rose, while a rose that does not have this additional harmony is an indifferent rose.¹⁰ But there is at least a possibility that there are kinds whose members are all beautiful. For example, one could make a strong case for the claim that all roses are beautiful. Hence, nothing further is required to find a rose beautiful than what is minimally required to recognize that it is a member of its kind. An ordinary experience of a rose is an experience of a beautiful rose. But if this is even a possibility, then Guyer's account is not fully successful.

3.3 Universal validity

Guyer's reading does not fully meet Kant's argument for the universal validity of judgments of taste. Kant derives the universal validity of judgments of taste from the state of mind that underlies cognition, because only this state of mind can be shared by all of us. But Guyer identifies free harmony with cognitive harmony exercised to a high degree. And this means that he distinguishes between different degrees of cognitive harmony. If what is required for cognition is some basic degree of harmony, then it does not strictly speaking follow that a degree of harmony, which exceeds the basic organization of the manifold, will also attain universal validity. Guyer claims that free harmony is a harmony that exceeds the normal requirement for cognition, and this implies that free harmony is not a requirement for cognition. And if this is so, then it does not necessarily follow that free harmony is universally communicable.

¹⁰Guyer 2008, p. 232.

3.4 Ugliness

Guyer's metacognitive approach cannot accommodate pure judgments about ugliness into the overall Kantian aesthetic picture.¹¹ If aesthetic harmony is a high degree of cognitive harmony, and if a lower degree of cognitive harmony is sufficient (given the basic degree of harmony required for cognition) for the occurrence of aesthetically indifferent objects, then the only possibility left for ugliness is to depend on a lack of cognitive harmony. But this is not possible according to Kant's epistemological theory; an object without cognitive harmony would be an object of which we could not be conscious. Hence, judgments of ugliness are impossible.¹²

Accordingly, Guyer proposes that experience of ugliness depends on some other source. He suggests three such sources. An object is ugly because, either (i) its sensory elements are displeasing (such as taste, touch, simple sound, or color), (ii) it is displeasurable because it is in disagreement with our moral standards, or (iii) an object's form is displeasurable because it is in disagreement with the concept of purpose, that is, with the idea of how an object's form should look. As an example of the ugliness of types (i) and (ii), Guyer puts forward Kant's example of the devastations of war. Devastations of war are ugly because they cause physical pain and are therefore disagreeable to our

¹¹The impossibility of accommodating judgments of ugliness into the Kantian aesthetic picture is not a problem merely for Guyer's metacognitive approach, but for Kant's theory of taste as well. Among Kant scholars, there are two main objections to the idea that judgments of ugliness are possible within Kantian aesthetics. The first objection was made by David Shier, who claimed that accommodation of the state of mind required for judgments of ugliness is inconsistent with Kant's argument for the universal validity of judgments of taste. In short, Shier claims that, according to Kant's argument, the state of mind on which judgments of taste depend can be nothing else but the free harmony of cognitive powers. But free harmony produces pleasure. But this means that that the universal state of mind of judgments of taste can only be the state of mind that produces pleasure. Consequently, judgments of taste are judgments of the beautiful alone (Shier 1998, p. 416). The second objection was made by Guyer, who claimed that the state of mind required for judgments of ugliness is inconsistent with Kant's epistemological theory. His argument is based on the premise that according to Kant's theory a conceptual harmony between imagination and understanding is required not only for cognition, but in order to have an experience of the object in the first place. The possibility of a state mind of sheer disharmony, required for judgments of ugliness, is therefore epistemologically precluded (Guyer 2005, p. 145-147).

¹²See Guyer 2005, p. 146-147; Rind 2002, p. 28.

senses, and because they violate our moral standards.¹³

Ugliness of type (iii) is where an object's formal qualities are in disagreement with our idea of how it should look (category-dependent ugliness). For example, Guyer writes: "... an asymmetry that we might find beautiful in an Art Nouveau home could strike us as hideous in a Renaissance church, or a sequence of notes that we might accept in an atonal piece by Schonberg might be jarring in a sonata by Hayden."¹⁴ In this case it is not formal qualities by themselves that cause displeasure, but displeasure is caused because they fail to fulfill our preconceived expectations of how an object should look.

Even though Guyer's account of ugliness is at least plausible for some cases of displeasure (and it is true that we do sometimes find objects ugly because they deviate from our established standards), it cannot, however, account for all of them. In order for there to be category-dependent ugliness of an object's form, there must in the first place be a standard for how an object should look. It is true, for example, that regarding the human face we have a standard of how a face should look. But this does not mean that for every object's form that we find ugly we also have an idea of how it should look.

Even if we have a concept with which we can categorize an object, this does not necessarily mean that a dependent aesthetic standard can be derived from that concept, because the concept may simply be too general. For example, in the case of dance, a dependent aesthetic judgment can be made according to some standard only if the concept with which we are judging the bodily movements is sufficiently contentful. More specifically, we can judge whether a specific sequence of bodily movements is a beautiful or ugly ballet on one hand, and also whether the same sequence of movements is a beautiful or ugly Polynesian war dance, because the standards are sufficiently contentful in each case. That the aesthetic evaluations made on the basis of the respective standards is likely to be different even given the same sequence of movements shows that these are indeed aesthetic evaluations dependent on a standard. However, it is not the case that simply

¹³Guyer 2005, p. 151.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 151.

because we can categorize an object under a concept that this necessarily supplies us with a standard against with which a dependent aesthetic judgment can be made. The concept of dance, for instance, is not on its own contentful enough to supply us with such a standard. If all that it is known about the sequence of bodily movements is that it is a dance, we have no standard with which to make a dependent aesthetic evaluation, but we can still judge it to be ugly.

The case is similar for paintings, because the objects belonging to this category are so fundamentally various that the categorization of an object as a painting is on its own again insufficient to supply us with a standard, despite our being able to find a painting ugly—even though we categorize it no more specifically than as a painting. The case with paintings is especially clear in the case of abstract art, where the freedom of form within the medium is so broad that no prior determinate idea of what such a painting should look like can be given. An abstract painting is just lines and colors, and it is not credible to say that we have some idea of what lines and colors *should* look like. However, we can find some composition of lines and colors ugly even though we have no standard for it (for example, Karel Appel's *Untitled*, 1957).

Furthermore, dependent ugliness, according to Guyer, comes from an object not satisfying criteria specified by its concept, that is, the idea of how it should look. But there can be cases where an object is ugly even if it does satisfy our expectations as to how it should look. For example, an animal called *anglerfish* can satisfy completely the criteria belonging to the concept of an anglerfish, while nevertheless being ugly, because even the most perfect specimen of an anglerfish is an ugly animal. The anglerfish is judged to be one of the most grotesque sea creatures, by virtue of its black body, disproportionately large head, wide open jaw and long, sharp teeth. It is this distinctive combination of features that makes the anglerfish so displeasing, even though these features are shared by all members of this natural kind. Such cases of ugliness do not fit into Guyer's definition of displeasure. Moreover, it is also incorrect to say that we find all displeasure of the senses ugly. For example, if a violinist plays a tone wrongly, I do not

necessarily find such a tone ugly, but merely discomforting or uneasy to my ear. Also, painful sensory stimuli are displeasurable, but few, if any, of these could really be called ugly. Therefore not all displeasures of the senses are ugly. Accordingly, Guyer's metacognitive interpretation of free harmony fails to give an adequate explanation of ugliness in Kant's aesthetics and is, therefore, ultimately unsuccessful.

4 Conclusion

To conclude, Guyer's metacognitive interpretation does not offer a full and satisfactory account of the notion of free play in Kant's aesthetics, because it cannot accommodate the following three beliefs that Kant seems to hold.

First, that judgments of taste are not determined by the concept of the object, and hence that they do not depend on the object's satisfaction of the essential conditions of the kind to which it belongs. But one consequence of Guyer's account of free harmony as a high degree of cognitive harmony is that every object that represents a perfect instance of its kind must be beautiful. Hence, Guyer's account is inadequate for a comprehensive interpretation of the notion of free play.

Second, that free play is similar enough to the play of cognitive powers in cognition that it can attain universal validity, and it is dissimilar enough that it does not necessarily accompany every object of cognition. Some objects of cognition do not have free play. Guyer's interpretation satisfies the latter criterion by claiming that free harmony exceeds the minimal conditions required for ordinary cognition, and therefore not all objects of cognition are beautiful. However, if free harmony exceeds the normal conditions required for cognition, then it follows that free harmony is not required for cognition, and therefore it cannot satisfy the requirement of universality.

Third, that there are pure judgments of ugliness. Even though accommodating judgments of ugliness into Kant's theory of taste is problematic, there is nevertheless implicit and explicit textual evidence that Kant acknowledged judgments of ugliness as pure judgments of taste. Guyer's metacognitive interpretation, however, cannot accom-

moderate pure judgments about ugliness.

Taking all of these points together, a deeper examination and reevaluation of Kant's notion of free play is required than has been given thus far.

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DEFINING SATIRE

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The purpose of this paper is to define satire in such a way that allows for the work of art to be interpreted as, in part or whole, satirical. To orient the philosophical project, I want to invoke Northrop Frye's understanding of satire from his *Anatomy of Criticism*. Frye identifies what I will take to be the two fundamental components of satire, which are wit "founded on fantasy . . . or the absurd," and an attack against an object outside the text.¹ My project, then, will be to draw out a philosophical account of these two components, and create a definition that unifies them. This paper is formed of three sections. The first section will sketch an account of how satirical criticism functions. The second section will engage humour, and set out the place of humour within satire. The third section will give a definition of satire in accordance with the previous two sections, and then test that definition through applying it to a case study.

1 Interpretation, and how satire attacks its target

Figuring out the relationship between a satirical artwork and the object that artwork is attacking might be a good starting point for working out a definition of satire—because it forces the question not only of how the target is being attacked, but also how the 'figuring out' happens. To this end, I will introduce Gregory Currie's theory of interpretation as laid out in *Image and Mind*. Specifically, Currie holds that to

¹Frye 1957, p. 222-3.

interpret is “to hypothesize about the intentional causes of whatever it is being interpreted.”² Finding the intentions behind a work, however, is not a straightforward matter. Quizzing the author herself is unhelpful on two counts. The first is that there is space between what the author believes and what the author does, so that it is possible that a belief can be expressed by a work without it either being believed by the author or the author meaning to express it. The second is that some works may have many authors, possibly with conflicting intentions. It is difficult to ask about the intentions underlying a filmic scene when it displays the authority of dozens of people.³ There have, for instance, been documented cases where an actor and director on the same film have had conflicting intentions.⁴

Currie’s solution to the problems surrounding the obscurity of intentions begins with considering an artwork as the end result of intentional behaviour.⁵ The process of interpretation, on his view, is the reverse-engineering of the intentions that underlie an artwork by looking at it in its final state. Through this interpretive strategy, a new idealized hypothetical author is thought to be ‘implied.’ In Currie’s own words, implied author intentionalism is:

That the implied author intends P to be fictional means just that the text can reasonably be thought of as produced by someone intending the reader to recognize that P is fictional.⁶

The upshot of this strategy, with regard to the interpretation of a satirical work, is that we can figure out what, if anything, is being attacked by identifying evidence in the artwork itself.

The next task is to identify how the implied author, as constructed from textual evidence, manages to attack something external to the

²Currie 1995, p. 226.

³Any given scene can, for example, show the work of the screenwriters, directors, actors, set designers, and many others.

⁴One case being Harrison Ford and Ridley Scott disagreeing over the nature of Ford’s character in *Blade Runner* (Greenwald 2007).

⁵Currie 1995, p. 239.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 245.

work. Since the thing outside of the work is being attacked in the work, it must be represented in the work in some way. In identifying how this representation functions, it helps to take up some ideas of Gaut's, specifically relating to what he calls 'double objects'.⁷ A double object is the target of satirical criticism, and ties the external object of criticism to the text. There are two halves to a double object. Within the work there is the 'intentional object,' which is the target of attack purely within the work.⁸ External to the work there is the 'model,' which is both the ultimate target of attack and the basis of the intentional object.⁹ Anything may be used as a model: individual persons, political systems, or just clusters of ideas. The intentional object is similarly open-ended in possibility, but must bring together those elements of the model that are to be criticized. Accordingly, intentional objects are often individual persons, since turning abstract intellectual issues into character traits is a common literary device used to make such abstract issues more concrete.¹⁰ What is needed, then, is to explicate the relationship between the two—between the intentional object and the model.

The intentional object cannot simply be the model accurately and completely inserted into fiction, as that would reduce the work to mere invective. As an example, the characters in *An American Carol* (2008) taking turns to hit Michael Moore is not, as such, satirical. It is, rather, just a depiction of abuse. For the work to be properly satirical there has to be some sort of abstraction or misrepresentation in moving from the model to the intentional object. For an example of a satirical misrepresentation of Michael Moore, consider his appearance in *Team America: World Police* (2004). Here he is exaggerated as an America-hating terrorist, to the point where he suicide bombs the heroes' headquarters. Since there is a misrepresentation occurring, there is more being displayed than a simple antipathy towards Moore in this depiction. It is important to note that the misrepresentation

⁷Gaut 2007, p. 248.

⁸Ibid., p. 248.

⁹Ibid., p. 248.

¹⁰One good contemporary example of abstract ideas being represented in a single person is the character of Judge Dredd, who is a collation of technocratic and militaristic American ideals about policing.

is related to what is being criticized, and that it is not satirical to simply present a cruel misrepresentation of the model. For an example of a simply cruel misrepresentation, Michael Crichton, as an act of revenge against Michael Crowley,¹¹ wrote a character into his novel *Next* named Mick Crowley who was solely presented as a paedophile.¹²

Since, in accordance with Currie's theory of interpretation, the relationship between the intentional object and model must be identifiable in the work and, in cases of satire, the intentional object must misrepresent the model in some relevant way, the attack against the model must be conducted through the way in which it is misrepresented. This means that it is not enough for the model to be misrepresented, but that the misrepresentation must also be central to the criticism. For the misrepresentation to be central to the criticism, it can be the case that either the misrepresentation constitutes the criticism, or the criticism follows from the misrepresentation. An example of the former would be political or economic leadership being represented as a fat pig wearing a crown, showing leaders as gluttonous and ruling without concern for the broader population.¹³ Examples of the latter are often found in dystopian fiction, such as Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, where Los Angeles' consumerist hedonism is represented as a sterile society that has stifled virtue and human excellence. This explains why the Crowley case is not satire while the *Team America* case is. With Crowley, none of his attitudes or attributes are being misrepresented; he is simply cast as a paedophile. No judgment is manifested towards him beyond the evocation of a vague antipathy. With *Team America's* Moore, on the other hand, Moore's criticism of the United States is exaggerated into a deranged hatred, to the point that Moore takes on the characteristics of what the authors take to be the absolute enemies of America: Islamic terrorists. The model Moore is then not just being attacked, but being attacked for attitudes that he holds and has really expressed, and in a way that makes use of an

¹¹Crowley, as editor of *The New Republic*, had written an editorial critical of Crichton's writing on global warming.

¹²Lee 2006.

¹³For a straightforward example of this, see the music video for Billy Talent's 'Surprise Surprise'.

exaggerated representation of those views. It is this kind of attack, incorporating a misrepresentation of actual features of the target, that is the mark of the satirical.

2 Wit and humour in satire

If misrepresentation is the conduit between the model and the intentional object, wit is how the conduit operates. To elaborate on the function of wit, I want to use Gaut's distinction between prescribed and merited response.¹⁴ A prescribed response is one that an artwork invites an audience to take. A merited response, on the other hand, is the response that the audience *ought* to take. This distinction comes to the fore in genres like horror or comedy, where a film may prescribe terror or laughter in a situation that is not frightening or funny, respectively. With respect to comedies, Gaut applies the distinction to humour to emphasize that for something to be properly amusing what matters is not whether or not someone finds it funny, but whether or not it *merits* amusement.¹⁵ Requiring satirical misrepresentation to be amusing serves as a guarantor of the connection between the intentional object and the model: for the misrepresentation to be amusing it must not just accurately connect the intentional object and model, but it must do so in a way that accurately conveys a criticism of some sort. Recalling *Team America's* Moore, what is amusing is not just that the character of Moore is a terrorist, but specifically that it is *Moore who is being presented as a terrorist*. The amusement relevant to the satire derives in part from properties of the half of the double object external to the work.

That the connection through the double object has to be amusing does not mean that the work has to prescribe humour. It may be that the misrepresentation occurs at such a point or in such a way that another response, such as insight, awe, or admiration, crowds out any humour—but this does not undermine the role of the double object. Were someone to somehow fail to experience insight, awe, or admi-

¹⁴Gaut 2007, p. 231.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 246.

ration and still experience humour their amusement would still be merited. It could also be the case that the misrepresentation does not become apparent without extended reflection. In this case it would be possible to identify an element after the event as amusing without ever actually experiencing amusement. For example, with Huxley's *Brave New World*, the representation of early-century Los Angeles as a futuristic dystopia may never prescribe amusement but still be amusing after reflecting on the way that Los Angeles is misrepresented in the book. Despite this, humour still plays two very important roles in satire. The first is that it can serve a palliative role in making fundamentally unpleasant insights or topics more bearable. Its second, and arguably more important, role is to underscore to the audience that the artwork is in fact satirical. Satirists always run the risk of their satire being lost on the audience, so humour clarifies that not everything should be taken at face value. However, despite these two important roles of humour, neither plays to the question of whether or not a work is satirical to begin with.

3 A definition of satire, stated and applied

Combining the roles of misrepresentation (as facilitated by Currie's theory of interpretation) and wit (as facilitated by Gaut's notion of amusement), the following definition of satire might be plausible:

An artwork is satirical, in part or in whole, if it makes a criticism through the use of a double object where the double object operates through an amusing misrepresentation.

In interpreting a particular satirical work, we need to ask two questions. First, what are the intentional object and model of the double object? And second, how is the model misrepresented and what criticism does this misrepresentation convey? For example, consider the character Stephen Colbert, anchor of the satirical news show *The Colbert Report*.¹⁶ Here, the character is the intentional object, where the

¹⁶*The Colbert Report* is a particularly relevant piece of satire because of the way that audiences interact with it. A 2009 study showed that viewers, regardless of their own political ideology, would project their

model is Bill O'Reilly of Fox News' *The O'Reilly Factor*. The misrepresentation is one of exaggeration: Colbert seizes upon and amplifies O'Reilly's self-aggrandizement, nationalism, and aggressiveness. The criticism of O'Reilly, and those similar to him, is conveyed through the way that Colbert renders these characteristics ridiculous: for example, before an interview, instead of having the interviewee walk out to applause, Colbert will run out to the audience to pose and preen.

A trickier case is that of another comedy-news program, *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*. Here, rather than a character playing the intentional object to a particular model, different segments will constitute intentional objects that are modeled on trends or styles of reporting by 'serious' news networks. The misrepresentations usually vary by segment, but they frequently serve the same purpose, which is to draw attention to a particular foible of standard news reporting. As an example, a piece of ridiculous trivia that is treated with the utmost seriousness works to criticize the way self-serious news networks create stories out of irrelevancies. It is important to note that not everything about the show is satirical. Stewart, the host, will sometimes go on polemical rants that are not satirical, and where there is no double object—he is simply offering criticism. Similarly, the show will often give the news with jokes. Since there is again no double object or misrepresentation, news-with-jokes is not satirical.¹⁷

When interpreting works of art, it is important to distinguish between bad satire and failed satire. 'Bad satire' may refer to any piece of satirical artwork where one or more of its constitutive elements are particularly poor. 'Failed satire,' meanwhile, concerns the real creator of an artwork and their failure as an artist in producing a work of satire. Critically, bad satire is still satire, while failed satire is not. This distinction comes to the fore with cases of bad satire where an element is so bad that the instinctive reaction might be to consider the artwork to be a case of failed satire. Two examples of bad and failed satire re-

personal ideology on to the show as the show's underlying critical motivation (LaMarre, Landreville, and Beam 2009).

¹⁷It is arguable as to whether or not the show as a whole is satirical. Given that Stewart frequently insists that the show is not political, it is reasonable to infer that he himself conceives of the show as generally conforming to the news-with-jokes format.

spectively might be as follows: first, a misrepresentation is so spurious that the putative intentional object appears to bear no similarity to the model. Second, the criticism attempted by the misrepresentation is so ill formed and off-target that it appears to be no criticism at all.

Both cases may be solved, I propose, by appealing to the interpretive processes proposed by hypothetical intentionalism. So, for cases of the first kind, if an artwork may be reasonably interpreted such that its creator intended the intentional object to be a misrepresentation of the model, then the work may be considered a proper satire, albeit a bad one. Cases of this type crop up most frequently in political cartoons. Consider a cartoon of David Cameron, in a rabbit suit, holding a surfboard. What the rabbit suit or surfboard represent is utterly unclear but, owing to the context of this being a political cartoon it is fair to infer that they do represent something to do with current affairs involving the Prime Minister. While the meaning of the rabbit suit and surfboard may be obscure, it is still clear that Cameron is being misrepresented: the intentional object of the rabbit-suit-wearing Cameron allows for the identification of the model object, which is the real Cameron. It is important to emphasize that this cartoon only works as a satire of David Cameron. Were the artist attempting to create a satire of something else, and as such intended the rabbit suit and surfboard to constitute the intentional object, then the work would fail as satire because there is no way of identifying what would be the model objects.

There is another way that misrepresentation can come apart, which we saw above with the two Michael Moore examples. In *An American Carol*, Moore is simply inserted into the story as a victim of abuse. Here, instead of there being a spurious misrepresentation, there is simply no misrepresentation. If the makers of the film were intending this part of the film to satirize Moore, they failed. The misrepresentation of Moore in *Team America*, as a terrorist, may be trite and simplistic but it is still a misrepresentation with identifiable intentional and model objects. It may be bad, but it is not a failure.

Cases of the second kind, that is, ill-formed or off-target criticism, are solved in much the same as cases of the first kind, of spurious and

dissimilar misrepresentation. Often, failures in cases of the second kind will reduce to failures of the first kind: if an artist did such a poor job of articulating their would-be satirical criticism that the criticism is not identifiable in the final artwork, then it is likely that the would-be model object will not be identifiable in the work. However, there are times when double objects are identifiable but no real criticism is evident. The best examples of this might be Jason Friedberg and Aaron Seltzer's series of parody films. One example, just one among many, would be when a character in *Disaster Movie*, modeled on Indiana Jones, is played by a black midget who proclaims "I am your father," a line famously belonging to the character Darth Vader in *Star Wars*. By dress and by name the character is clearly identifiable as the intentional object of Indiana Jones, but there is no criticism of which we can make sense. The Mick Crowley case is similar: Misrepresenting Michael Crowley as a paedophile, while creating an unflattering intentional object, does not convey any actual criticism of the real person Michael Crowley.

4 Concluding remarks

The definition of satire that I offer here is friendly to both the critic and audience-member, as it is primarily interested in the interpretation of works of art. It is a largely intuitive definition, I believe, as it concerns itself with connecting two important aspects of satire: humour and criticism. While a working definition of satire will open up avenues for future research, the test of such a definition will ultimately be in how easily and confidently it can be applied when interpreting works of art. To that end, I hope I have provided a useful tool for art interpretation and appreciation.

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SCORING DANCE

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It is often claimed that dance is a particularly ephemeral medium, more so than its neighbouring forms of music and theatre. For example, Marcia Siegel makes the oft-cited suggestion that “dance exists at a perpetual vanishing point.”¹ The claim for ephemerality is based upon dance’s seemingly loose relationship to scores and other physical objects involved in production. Whilst theatre is traditionally created through writing a script, and music composed on paper, dance is not seen to share this feature. Choreography occurs in numerous ways, and dance does not operate under a codified notational system. This means that dance works are widely considered to physically exist only in performance.² However, recent discourse and practice has revealed many ways that dance is created and preserved through tangible written or notated objects. Whilst the traditional view suggests that scores do not provide access to the work,³ I question this claim by examining the centrality of the score in the making and re-staging of Allan Kaprow’s *18 Happenings in 6 Parts* (1959), and by assessing the relationship between digital score and performance work in the case of William Forsythe’s website *Synchronous Objects for One Flat Thing, reproduced* (2009). Further, I will examine each example in relation to Graham McFee’s ‘Thesis of Notationality’;⁴ in order to understand in

¹Siegel 1972.

²Carr 1987; McFee 1992; McFee 2011.

³Goodman 1968; Carr 1987; McFee 1992; McFee 2011.

⁴McFee 1992, p. 99.

more depth the role that notational forms play in current dance practice, to show that dance works are more than abstract structures of bodily movement, and that they may include notational objects as an integral aspect.

1 Notation and scores, works and performances: the traditional view

In *Languages of Art*, Nelson Goodman provides a detailed account of the role and function of artistic scores, as well as stringent requirements for notational systems. Goodman claims that in the case of performing arts such as music, a score is a tool for the performance of a work, and is “no more intrinsic to the work than the sculptor’s hammer or the painter’s easel.”⁵ However, he claims that scores have an important theoretical role, as they can be used to identify a work from performance to performance.⁶ Goodman views the relationship between score and performance as crucial for work-identity, going as far as to suggest that performances must fully comply with their relative scores, and that even one wrong note results in the performance failing to be an instance of the work.⁷ This is theoretically possible, as Goodman does not suggest a score should notate all of the features that must be present in a performance, but rather that the score records the essential features.

Goodman claims that, “the language in which a score is written must be notational,”⁸ by which he means that it must meet his five semantic and syntactic requirements. According to Goodman, scores, and therefore notation, differ from a “drawing, study or sketch on the one hand and from a verbal description, scenario or script on the other.”⁹ On Goodman’s view, notation uses inscribed characters to denote components, with each inscription standing for only one character, hence avoiding the ambiguity associated with words, drawings,

⁵Goodman 1968, p. 127.

⁶Ibid., p. 127.

⁷Ibid., p. 129.

⁸Ibid., p. 178.

⁹Ibid., p. 127.

or even descriptions, which have the potential for multiple interpretations. It is evident that the notational requirements suit musical practice, yet in the case of dance there are only a few systems that meet Goodman's criteria. He points out that the method of Labanotation passes the theoretical test for notation, as it allows for the essential features of a dance work to be recorded.¹⁰

Labanotation notates movement and is not specific to dance. It operates similarly to music notation, using symbols on a vertical staff to denote body parts as opposed to notes. It offers a highly detailed description of the movement of the body. Labanotation scores record the work as a structure of movement, rather than describing concepts or scenography, for example. In *Understanding Dance*, McFee stresses the potential that Labanotation holds for dance, believing it has a helpful role in identifying and preserving works.¹¹ Although not used extensively at the time in which he was writing, McFee envisaged an increase in the practice of notation.¹² Dance works are particularly fluid entities; revisions, re-stagings and re-workings are common practice, resulting in multiple versions of works, and subsequent work-identity questions. Furthermore, dance works are difficult to preserve. Although recording has aided preservation: a recorded performance depicts only one version of the work, hiding the essential feature of variability from sight. Labanotation seems to be a logical solution to these issues. However, for economic and practical reasons, use of Labanotation has not increased since 1992, and no single system has become universal. However, this does not mean that dance works are non-notational. It means, rather, that notation takes numerous forms.

McFee proposes a 'Thesis of Notationality', suggesting that:

Performance A and performance B were performances of the same work of art (in any performing art) just in that case where both satisfied or instantiated some particular 'text' in a notation agreed by the knowledgeable in the art

¹⁰Ibid., p. 127.

¹¹McFee 1992, p. 99.

¹²McFee 2011, p. 71.

form to be an adequate notation for that form.¹³

He further develops this thesis in *The Philosophical Aesthetics of Dance*, reiterating his claim that notation can offer a way of resolving work-identity questions for dance, despite Labanotation not having become commonplace in dance practice.¹⁴ It is important to note that although McFee's thesis does not require a specific form, like Goodman, he does require a notational language—as opposed to a written account.

Dance scores are created before, during, or after the work, McFee explains, and therefore are intended as either records or 'recipes'—although scores created as records can also be used as a recipe to re-instantiate the work.¹⁵ Whilst it is theoretically possible to compose a dance by writing a Labanotation score, this is unusual; the score is usually created alongside or after the work, by a trained professional—usually someone other than the choreographer. Therefore a degree of interpretation is involved, and the score generally records the work, as opposed to being a direct outcome of the creative process. This gives a Labanotation score a different status to a musical score or the script of a play, both of which are traditionally instructions for the first performance.

Following Goodman, McFee believes that, regardless of the way in which the score is created, it does not provide access to the work.¹⁶ This is what I refer to as the 'traditional view', that is, that a dance work is an abstract object only accessible through performance. This is a view shared by David Carr, who suggests in 'Thought and Action in the Art of Dance' that whilst we can experience features of a play through reading the script, "Choreography just is the making of dances (not the mere 'writing' of them)."¹⁷ Following the model whereby a score is used to record an existing dance, this claim seems logical, however Carr's suggestion does not allow for the many ways in which choreography can occur, which may include writing. Choreography is often

¹³McFee 1992, p. 97-98.

¹⁴McFee 2011.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Goodman 1968, p. 127; McFee 1992, p. 88.

¹⁷Carr 1987, p. 352.

created on the page, albeit not through codified notational methods. In fact, the word ‘choreography’ derives from the Greek words ‘*chor-eia*’, meaning ‘dance’, and ‘*graphein*’, meaning ‘to write’. Dance has a long tradition of being planned, composed, and written prior to being embodied, and this practice goes as far back as the seventeenth century, when some of the first ballets were choreographed at a desk.¹⁸

The planning, sketching, and writing of dance often takes linguistic or idiosyncratic forms. These methods are often seen in current dance research and practice. In the UK, over the past decade, choreographic processes have increasingly been shared in various contexts and forms.¹⁹ In the introduction to a recent issue of *The International Journal of Performance Art and Digital Media*, Johannes Birringer suggests that “we live in a changing world of dance, and the level of discourse regarding dance and choreographic practice has been raised considerably compared to the mid or late 20th century.”²⁰ There are many possible reasons for this rise, including the development of practice-as-research, which involves artistic practice as a method of academic enquiry, and subsequently acknowledges choreography as an epistemologically valuable activity. One of the outcomes of this is that we are now privy to many of the notes, sketches, diagrams, and lists that are the products of choreography. As a choreographical term, ‘score’ has become so broad that Birringer suggests that “there is always a score, in all artistic practices and in all contexts where art is exhibited/performed.”²¹ Here Birringer is referring to a score as a set of structures that determines how an artwork is performed or displayed. This is in direct contradiction to Goodman, who claims that permanent physical objects, such as paintings do not require scores.²² The vast expansion of the concept of the score results in its referring to objects that do not inherit the ontological clarity of Labanotation. Developed with varied intentions, the status and function of these scores is

¹⁸Laurenti 1994, p. 86.

¹⁹See Anne Teresa de Keersmaecker and Bojana Cvejić’s *A Choreographer’s Score* (2012) and William Forsythe’s *Motion Bank* (2010-2014).

²⁰Birringer 2013, p. 8.

²¹Ibid., p. 10.

²²Goodman 1968, p. 127.

harder to define and their relationship to the work difficult to establish.

2 *18 Happenings in 6 Parts*

I want to give two examples of recent scoring practices, both of which reveal the nature of dance notation and shed light on the traditional view of dance works. The first is Alan Kaprow's *18 Happenings in 6 Parts*. Kaprow developed the work by writing a detailed score, consisting of diagrams, sketches, and lists of instructions.²³ *18 Happenings* was not initially created to be a dance; it was a performative event that took place on 4th October 1959 at the Rueben Gallery in New York. Jeff Kelley describes coloured lights, recorded sounds, odours, speech, and routine-like actions.²⁴

The event did not fit neatly into any existing category of performing or visual arts. According to Kelley, it became the first 'happening'. Responsible for the coining of the term, it came to mark the subsequent development of a new class of performance.²⁵ Happenings are considered dependent upon their one-off nature, excluding them from the category of 'performables', which are defined by their potential for repetition.²⁶ This leaves happenings and dance works ontologically distinct. However, it is recent re-stagings of the work that are of interest here. Re-performances of *18 Happenings* have demonstrated the work to be both performable and a dance work. The work was first re-staged in 2006 by dance theorist and curator Andre Lepecki, at Munich's Haus de Kunst. In 2010 UK choreographer Rosemary Butcher also re-staged *18 Happenings* at the Haywood Gallery in London. Significantly, these re-stagings, and subsequent accounts of the process, reveal the centrality of the score to the work as well as its ontological instability.

During a discussion about the re-staging, Lepecki explains that Kaprow created multiple scores, as well as over 400 pages of notes

²³Lepecki 2012.

²⁴Kelley 2012, p. 22.

²⁵Ibid., p. 22.

²⁶McFee 2011, p. 160.

and instructions.²⁷ Lepecki suggests that he was initially reluctant to undertake the project due to the perceived singularity of happenings; however, consulting Kaprow's score encouraged him to take the project on.²⁸ The restaging of *18 Happenings* has a number of potential outcomes for its status as a happening. Perhaps it suggests that, despite the work's name and its impact at the time of the first performance, the work was in fact a performable all along, and therefore is not a happening. It is plausible that the re-performance of the work reveals a feature (i.e., its performability), that was previously unrecognised.

An alternative outcome would be to suggest that the work remains a happening, but that happenings are in fact repeatable. This is contentious, as it challenges the defining feature of this type of performance. So what is the difference between *18 Happenings*, and subsequent, legitimate happenings? The answer to this question lies in the score. Were it not for the existence of the score, and Lepecki's subsequent ability to access the work through this score, the re-staging would not have occurred, and *18 Happenings* would have remained a happening, with the potential for re-performance greatly diminished. Lepecki claims that consulting the score demonstrated the performable nature of the work, and revealed Kaprow's intention for the work to be repeatable. He outlines a crucial sentence in Kaprow's notes, where Kaprow suggests that, "Each of these parts may be arranged indefinitely."²⁹ This clearly confirms the work's status as an ongoing, repeatable entity, reiterating both the fundamental role of the score in the work's ontology as well as the work's performability.

Indeed Kaprow agreed for a restaging to take place in 2006.³⁰ This suggests that *18 Happenings* was always intended to be a performable, a feature revealed through the re-staging, and enabled by the score. Nevertheless, it was not always a dance work. Re-stagings of *18 Happenings* by dance professionals has re-situated the work. Distinctions

²⁷Lepecki 2012.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Meyer-Hermann, Rosenthal, and Lepecki 2007, p. 45.

³⁰Lepecki 2012.

between forms have become increasingly fluid, and it is accepted that performance works in particular might belong to multiple categories. The work of physical theatre company DV8 provides a well-known example of this fluidity. Furthermore, conceptual choreographic practices, such as those of choreographer La Ribot, can be seen as belonging equally to dance, performance art, and theatre. These ascriptions to categories are not based on content or style, but rather on who created the work, as well as where, when, and why the work was created. To put it another way, the lack of defining features, whether perceptible or intrinsic, of performing art forms means that we increasingly rely upon context to categorise or define a work. This accounts for the way in which the appropriation of *18 Happenings* by dance professionals was enough to justify its status as a dance work.

Accepting *18 Happenings* as a dance work implies that the re-staging can tell us something about choreographic practice. Lepecki points out that Kaprow had a 'deep investment in scripts', and that working on paper allowed him to find a way to organise movement.³¹ This reiterates the textual nature of choreography; it also reiterates the ontological importance of the score. Such is the importance of the score of *18 Happenings* that Lepecki makes a significant claim regarding its role. Suggesting the work was created on paper, he claims that the creation of the work was not dependent upon embodiment, even if the performative execution of this piece did exhibit this dependency.³² This demonstrates how the act of choreography can occur without the body, challenging Carr's claim about its essentially embodied nature. Whilst it seems safe to claim that dance scores are composed in reference to the body, as is the case with Kaprow's choreography for *18 Happenings*, the act of choreography sits apart from the act of dancing. Choreography can (and does) take place without dancing. This position does not represent all choreographic practices, some of which are heavily dependent upon improvisation, for example, but it demonstrates that choreography in itself does not necessarily require a present, dancing body. This implication is that in cases where the

³¹Lepecki 2012.

³²Ibid.

work is created through writing a score, the work exists on the page prior to instantiation, shifting dance ontology closer to theatre and music and highlighting the ontological centrality of the score. As Carr suggests in relation to theatre, we are able to access some of the features of *18 Happenings* through consulting the score; hence Lepecki's ability to re-stage the piece.

It is possible, however, that Kaprow's score is not a score after all. Lepecki refers to it as both score and script, and draws a distinction between the score and other notes and instructions for the work.³³ The score does not take the form of a codified notational system; it consists of instructions, drawn figures, often with arrows denoting movement, and many written notes.³⁴ The form certainly does not meet Goodman's strict requirements for being a notational system. Neither does it offer a detailed account of the body, like Labanotation might. But we might justify its status as a score simply by taking references to the work in discourse, where it is considered to be a score, seriously. Furthermore, although the language of the piece does not meet Goodman's requirements for a notational system, it does meet McFee's Thesis of Notationality: the form it is written in is accepted and understood by dance practitioners. Furthermore, two separate performances, each following the score, will both be instances of *18 Happenings*, demonstrated by the re-staging of the work. The form of the score is important: it differs from usual Labanotation scores in three key ways. First, it does not focus on the details of bodily movement; second, it was created prior to the work; and third, it was created by the author of the work.

Significantly, these features are made possible by the non-codified form of the notation. It is unusual for choreographers to also be professional notators, and as such authorship of the score is usually distinct from authorship of the work. This could be a key reason for the use of idiosyncratic forms of notation in dance. Scoring is used by choreographers to make sense of ideas, and to plan works, as opposed to being used to record the details of specific movements. This allows

³³Ibid.

³⁴Meyer-Hermann, Rosenthal, and Lepecki 2007, pp. 1-7.

for choreography to occur on the page, for scores to exist prior to performance, and therefore for features of works to be accessed through the score.

3 *Synchronous Objects*

American choreographer William Forsythe is one of a growing number of artists turning their attention to the relationship between inscription, process, performance, and technology. In his essay 'Choreographic Objects', Forsythe distinguishes between choreography and dance, asking, "is it possible for choreography to generate autonomous expressions of its principles, a choreographic object, without the body?"³⁵ One of the first outcomes of Forsythe's exploration of this question was the website *Synchronous Objects* (SO), created in 2009 in collaboration with Maria Palazzi and Norah Zuniga Shaw. The site aims to examine the choreographic structures and systems of his dance work *One Flat Thing, reproduced* (OFTR) (2000).

This exploration focuses on a filmed version of OFTR made in 2006. SO entails twenty 'choreographic objects', comprising visualisations, graphs, and diagrams, which demonstrate the structure and operating systems of OFTR. The objects examine components such as dynamics, counterpoint, cues, sound, architecture, and so on. One example is the 'Cue Score', which explains through graphs and diagrams the cueing system that triggers the performance activity. Other tools include the 'Alignment Annotator', which visualises the relationship between the dancers through coloured shapes and lines, and the 'Counterpoint Tool', which uses a pattern-generating algorithm to allow users to control performing 'widgets', in order to experiment with the possibilities of counterpoint.³⁶

Drawing a distinction between choreography and instances of embodiment is not entirely new. It refers back to the traditional view of dance works as abstract objects distinct from physical performances. Although articulated differently, Forsythe's unfastening of dancing

³⁵Forsythe 2008.

³⁶Documentation of these tools can be found on the SO website: <http://synchronousobjects.osu.edu>

and choreography can be seen to follow a similar line of reasoning as the philosophers we have examined, McFee and Goodman, who claim that dance works are essentially abstract movement structures. However, it is important to acknowledge that SO demonstrates the notationality of structures other than movement.

Some of the tools on SO appear to adopt codified notational languages, using symbols to denote components. However, the diagrams do not describe the movement of body parts, as is the case with Labanotation. Rather, the focus is on describing non-visual, relational features, such as cueing, dynamics and counterpoint. Furthermore, SO was not generated as a record or a recipe; it was developed to enhance our understanding of the work, and to examine the complexities of choreographic structure.³⁷ How, then, does it relate to the concept of a score, in either notational or non-notational form?

Unfortunately I do not have space here to analyse all of the tools on SO against Goodman's five requirements for notation. Suffice it to say that some tools would be closer to meeting the requirements than others, which are perhaps better explained through Goodman's discussions of diagrams and models.³⁸ Importantly, however, SO does seem to fulfil the requirements of the Thesis of Notationality. Although not intended to function as a recipe, interpreting the 'text' would arguably result in a performance of OFTR. It is important to remember that McFee requires only that the notation be "agreed by the knowledgeable in the art form to be an adequate notation for that form."³⁹ It may seem that SO does not meet this condition; it uses languages from various disciplines, which need to be decoded through written explanation. However, although McFee's thesis calls for a notational language that is distinct from writing, surely any non-universal system would need some further linguistic explanation or translation. As such, there is no reason to suppose that these forms are not a legitimate way of notating choreography, despite not notating the body.

Claiming that the dynamic archive of the website is a choreo-

³⁷Forsythe 2009.

³⁸Goodman 1968, p. 170ff.

³⁹McFee 1992, p. 97-98.

graphic score decentralises movement as the primary feature of choreography, due to the fact that the specific behaviour of individual body parts is simply not notated. Were the whole site to function as a recipe for performance, in terms of movement dancers would simply have to copy the recording. This would not meet the requirements of McFee's thesis, as a recording is not a notational language. An alternative approach would be to use only the notational forms as a recipe, which would result in an alternative expression of the choreographic principles of the work, thus highlighting a key feature of the project by responding to the primary research question: "What else might physical thinking look like?"⁴⁰

It is unclear how SO relates to OFTR. The website annotates a recorded version of the work. Significantly, it is not a recording of a live performance. McFee suggests that, as with scores, we cannot access dance works through recordings,⁴¹ but we can question this in relation to dance performances made especially for film, as is the case here. The question of SO's ontological status is made more difficult by the complex nature of dance on film.⁴² Philip Auslander and Noel Carroll both provide arguments for the performative ontology of film.⁴³ Like performances, films are enacted temporarily. Furthermore, it is possible to see digital information as ontologically similar to traditional performances—for example SO is not permanently physically present, rather it is enacted by the user. For example, the appearance and performance of the 'widget' is dependent upon user-activation. Leaving aside the metaphysics of source codes, it would be fair to say that the site exists in tangible form only temporarily. When activated, the performances and structures on the site unfold in relation to time. Although we can stop and replay, these subsequent actions are similarly played out in the passing of time. The point is that, like a dance work, SO is abstract until made concrete, for a limited time; its physical manifestation is merely temporal, while the score performs.

⁴⁰Forsythe 2009.

⁴¹McFee 1992, p. 88.

⁴²See Blades 2011.

⁴³Auslander 1999; Carroll 2005.

The parallel between performance and recording suffers from the determined nature of recording. No matter how willing and able we are to suspend our belief, the fact remains that the performance on film has already been resolved. The dancers know how the performance ended, even if we, as spectators, do not. But while the film of OFTR possesses this determined nature, SO does not. The interactive nature of some of the tools, such as the Counterpoint Tool, offers potentially infinite outcomes. The tool provides a framework through which users can experiment with counterpoint, creating individual choreographic expressions. This reflects some of the features of a notated score. One of the reasons that McFee privileges notation over recordings, for recording and preserving dance, is that notation allows the key ontological feature of variability to remain intact. A notated score will inevitably involve interpretation, and allow for individual expression. This feature is similarly present in the interactive tools offered on SO. Like a score, the site operates within a constrained form whilst allowing for potentially infinite outcomes.

Perhaps we have reached a conclusion that SO is an interactive, performative score. However, the website is not primarily intended to function as a tool for re-instancing OFTR. SO provides information about OFTR; it enhances our understanding and appreciation of the work. If this is correct, is it possible to claim that the site does not provide access to the work? Here we are again faced with a problem surrounding the nature of recording. We are able to gain knowledge about a work through pausing, rewinding, and replaying films. But if this is not experiencing the work, then what does dance spectatorship entail? While this question demonstrates the austere and potentially problematic claim that we do not at all have access to OFTR through SO, unfortunately I do not have space to go into the question here. But this type of score provides us with much more than a solution to work-identity questions; it enhances our knowledge both of the work and of the complexities of choreographic structures.

4 Conclusion

18 Happenings and *Synchronous Objects* offer very different examples of dance scores. Kaprow's score demonstrates the way that choreography can follow a similar model to theatre, using language and drawing to instigate a performance. This challenges the traditional view by suggesting that a score can provide access to specific features of the work; a claim that is demonstrated through Lepecki's re-staging of *18 Happenings*. It is possible to see that ontological revelations facilitated by the re-staging are dependent upon the score, and therefore to attribute the score a central role in the nature of the work. SO, on the other hand, has a more complex relationship to the work it illustrates, and fulfils the requirements of a score possibly accidentally. Neither score follows a formal notational method for dance, and both use written language to explain certain features.

Nonetheless, both examples fulfil McFee's Thesis of Notationality, and furthermore demonstrate an expansion of this thesis. Scores are not only created for preservation, nor are they simply useful for work-identity; they also demonstrate choreography through forms other than performance, revealing the multi-faceted nature of dance, and its potential to exist in various ways. The way in which both examples demonstrate the notationality of choreography, whilst avoiding notating details of specific movements, decentralises the dancing body in such works. This outcome suggests that dance works are more than structures of movement. Rather, they consist of multiple conceptual, relational, and organisational features that can be described in linguistic, performative, and visual notations, as well as in traditional forms.

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