

GUYER'S INTERPRETATION OF FREE HARMONY IN KANT

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Kant's task in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* was to give an account of how genuine judgments of taste, that is, judgments about the beautiful (and the ugly), are possible.¹ His objective was to resolve an apparent contradiction between two characteristics pertaining to judgments of taste, that is, its subjectivity and universality. However, some interpreters have pointed out that Kant's resolution seems to be incompatible with his own epistemological views. Accordingly, Paul Guyer has recently defended a 'metacognitive' reading of Kant's claims. My aim in this paper is to examine and reevaluate Guyer's interpretative suggestion, and to point out the main difficulties with his approach. I will argue that his reading does not offer a full and satisfactory account of Kant's aesthetics, because it cannot accommodate three of Kant's core commitments.

1 Perception of the Beautiful

Which apparently contradictory ideas motivated Kant in his third *Critique*? The first idea is that judgments of taste are subjective, that is,

¹Kant defines taste as "... the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction *without any interest*. The object of such a satisfaction is called *beautiful*" (§5, 5:211. Emphasis added). Citations not otherwise identified refer to Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (2000). Citations to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1996) utilize the customary first (A) and second (B) edition format.

their determining ground can be nothing else but the subject's experience of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. That one aesthetically likes (or dislikes) an object must necessarily result from one's feeling of being delighted or pleased (or displeased) by that object, which cannot be imputed to someone by means of rational consideration. Beauty and ugliness are not objective properties of things in themselves, but merely represent the way in which we respond to objects. Kant claims accordingly that judgments of taste are not based on a concept of the object. Rather, judgments of taste are contrasted with cognitive judgments. Whereas the truth or falsity of cognitive judgments, such as 'x is a chair,' can be proven by rational consideration, and the judgment 'this x is a chair' is true if it satisfies the necessary conditions for the application of the concept of a chair, no such truth verification is possible in the case of judgments of taste. A judgment of taste is non-conceptual, Kant claims, which means that it is not determined by a concept of the object, but merely by a feeling: "If one judges objects merely in accordance with concepts, then all representation of beauty is lost. Thus there can also be no rule in accordance with which someone could be compelled to acknowledge something as beautiful" (§8, 5:216). Whether an object is beautiful is not discerned by whether it satisfies the properties of a concept. That is, a given object may be a perfect example of the kind it belongs to, yet still be ugly. If judgments of taste depend solely on the feeling of pleasure (or displeasure), and because feelings are not corrigible—that is, one cannot be wrong about one's own feelings—then judgments of taste have merely subjective validity.

Yet while Kant observes that judgments of taste are grounded in the subjective feeling of pleasure (or displeasure), he also acknowledges that they have some form of universal validity. We argue about matters of taste, which suggests that judgments of taste contain an implicit demand that others ought to agree with us and that some universal agreement can be established. Yet the validity of judgments of taste cannot be objective (as in cognitive judgments), since beauty is not a property of objects. Beauty resides in the subject's feeling of pleasure, and so the validity of judgments of taste is a 'subjective universal' va-

lidity. The universal validity of judgments of taste is grounded in the universal validity of a subject's feeling of pleasure:

. . . universality that does not rest on concepts of objects (even if only empirical ones) is not logical at all, but aesthetic, i.e., it does not contain an objective quantity of judgment, but only a subjective one, for which I also use the expression common validity, which does not designate the validity for every subject of the relation of a representation to the faculty of cognition but rather to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. (§8, 5:214)

A reconciliation of these seemingly incompatible characteristics of judgments of taste, that is, of subjectivity and universality, is the main objective of Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. He asks,

How is a judgment possible which, merely from one's own feeling of pleasure in an object, independent of its concept, judges this pleasure, as attached to the representation of the same object in every other subject, *a priori*, i.e., without having to wait for the assent of others? (§36, 5:288)

Kant finds the solution in a concept of harmony of the cognitive faculties in their free play. His argument can be roughly summarized in the following way: the universal validity of pleasure can be justified by claiming that the feeling of pleasure depends on a state of mind that we all share. But what we all share is a state of mind in which there is harmony between imagination and understanding. Kant claims that cognition is necessitated by the mental activities of imagination, whose function is to synthesize the manifold of intuition, and by the understanding, which unifies this manifold under the concept of the object. This harmony between the imagination and understanding is required for cognition, and is universally communicable, because without it "human beings could not communicate their representations and even cognition itself" (§38, 5:290). Pleasure in judgments of taste is based on such a harmonious relation of cognitive powers, and it must therefore be universally communicable.

On the other hand, Kant claims that the perception of the beautiful is different from cognition. He draws a distinction by claiming that in judgments of taste the harmonious relation of cognitive powers is in free play because “no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition” (§9, 5:217). This relation is *merely* subjective, Kant claims, since it refers only to the mutual relation between cognitive powers in the subject, without any relation to the object. Accordingly, while the relation between cognitive powers in cognitive judgments is not merely subjective but ends in the application of the concept to the object and therefore in a cognitive judgment, the relation between cognitive powers in judgments of taste is merely subjective (it does not apply concepts) and results in a feeling of pleasure alone.

2 Interpretations of Kant's solution

Contemporary scholars have major difficulties with Kant's argument. In particular, as Paul Guyer has pointed out, Kant's conception of free harmony is incompatible with his epistemological theory. Kant explains in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that concepts are not merely applied to the synthesis of imagination, but they *determine* the process of that synthesis. A concept, Kant says, is a rule for the synthesis of the manifold (A106). The imagination combines sense impressions and produces a perceptual image according to the concept. Imagination and understanding must be in harmony in order to present an object of perceptual experience, and this harmony is governed by concepts. Furthermore, Kant seems to claim that it is not only pure concepts (categories) that govern the synthesis of the manifold, but empirical concepts as well. The reasoning is the following:

- (1) Categories (such as substance, cause and effect etc.) are rules that govern the synthetic unity of all appearances, that is, they are conditions for the possibility of all experience (A128).
- (2) Categories do not have their own images: “Pure concepts of understanding, on the other hand, are quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions (indeed, from sensible intuitions generally)

and can never be encountered in any intuition” (A137/B176). That is, there is no image of a category of substance or an image of the category of cause and effect. All the images and laws we encounter in the empirical world are merely particular determinations of the categories (A128). For example, an image of a house is only a particular determination of the category of a substance, and the law that ‘the sun is the cause of the warmth of the stone’ is a particular determination of the category of cause and effect.

- (3) But if categories must be applied to the sensible manifold (in order to have perceptual experience), and if categories do not distinguish between particular images and laws, this means that in order to have an experience of a particular image, my sense impressions must be guided, not only by the categories, but by particular empirical concepts as well. That is, in order to have an image, say of a dog, the manifold of sense impressions must be guided not only by the category of a substance, but by the empirical concept of a dog as well. Accordingly, in order for categories to function as rules for the synthesis of any manifold of sensible impressions, they require the assistance of empirical concepts. Empirical concepts are necessary for the experience of objects, because only through them can the categories, required for the unity of consciousness, be applied to the sensible manifold.
- (4) But this in turn means that the apprehension of the form in aesthetic perception is not guided solely by the categories, but is also guided by the application of empirical concepts.²

Accordingly, we are presented with a difficulty. How can we understand the concept of free play, constitutive of judgments of taste, if such a play is not constituted by the complete absence of empirical concepts? A variety of interpretations of the concept of free play have emerged in order to reconcile the following contradictory theses that Kant seems to hold:

²This view has also been defended by Ginsborg (1997, p. 56).

- (i) Judgments of taste do not depend on the (empirical) concept of the object, but on the *mere* form of the object, or on presentation through the free play of imagination and understanding.
- (ii) Judgments of taste have the perception of the form of the object as their subject.
- (iii) The perception of the form of the object depends on an (empirical) concept.

Guyer classifies these interpretations into three main classes: pre-cognitive, multicognitive, and metacognitive interpretations. The last one is argued for by Guyer.³ In a nutshell, the main strategy of the pre-cognitive approach is to hold premises (i) and (ii), but deny premise (iii). It claims that the imagination has the ability to combine sense impressions and to produce a perceptual image without being governed by empirical concepts. Accordingly, free harmony is achieved prior (temporally) to the actual conceptualization of the intuition.⁴ A multicognitive approach instead holds premises (ii) and (iii), with a revision of (i). It claims that the free play of cognitive powers is attained by the application of a multiplicity of concepts. A judgment of taste is similar to an ordinary cognitive judgment, because it employs concepts, but while cognitive judgments subsume the manifold under one concept, judgments of taste do not apply a definite concept but rather play with a multitude of them, offering therefore a variety of different perceptions of a form.⁵ The metacognitive approach holds

³Guyer 2005, p. 147.

⁴The most advanced and established version of this approach has been given by Hannah Ginsborg. Ginsborg claims that the synthesis of sense impressions, by which we come to form a perceptual image, is not guided by empirical concepts, but is rather a natural process of combining sense impressions into forms and patterns. This process, she writes, has an inherent awareness of the appropriateness of the synthesis. Ginsborg calls such awareness a 'perceptual normativity,' and states that it is required for both empirical concept formation and judgments of taste. Perceptual normativity or free harmony is universally communicable, because it carries its own normativity, that is, there is an implicit awareness that one way of perceiving of an object is appropriate, and that everyone else ought to perceive that object in the same way. But this means that pleasure in judgments of the beautiful, resulting from free harmony, is universally communicable (Ginsborg 1997, p. 65).

⁵See Crowther (2010) and Rush (2001) for their version of the multicognitive approach.

premises (ii) and (iii), yet denies (i). It holds that aesthetic perception is dependent on empirical concepts. The difficulties with the first two approaches have already been tackled by Guyer, and as such my aim in what follows is to point out the main problems with Guyer's metacognitive approach.⁶

3 Guyer's metacognitive interpretation

According to Guyer, free harmony is constituted by conceptual synthesis exercised to a high degree. In order to experience free harmony we must first experience cognitive harmony, which is responsible for the ordinary perceptual experience of an object. While all objects have cognitive harmony in order to be represented to us, not all of them have free harmony. Free harmony is a cognitive harmony exercised to a high degree, that is, a harmony that exhibits order or unity that extends beyond the unity necessary for the recognition of an object "as it were, an excess of felt unity or harmony," or a "further degree of unity."⁷ Guyer describes free harmony in the following way:

free and harmonious play of imagination and understanding should be understood as a state of mind in which the manifold of intuition induced by the perception of an object and presented by the imagination to the understand-

⁶In short, Guyer's main objection against the precognitive and multicognitive approach is their inconsistency with Kant's epistemological theory. That is, they do not take into account that, according to Kant's theory of knowledge, the application of empirical concepts to the manifold of intuition is required for the experience of the object in the first place. Accordingly, there cannot be a harmony between cognitive powers devoid of any determinate conceptual applicability (Guyer 2006, p. 180-181). Furthermore, he points out that the most obvious difficulty for the precognitive approach is that it leads to the 'everything is beautiful' problem. Namely, if free harmony is constituted by the satisfaction of the same conditions that are required for ordinary cognition (yet, without the application of the concept), then it follows that every object of cognition must be in principle beautiful (ibid., p. 172). On the other hand, he writes that the main difficulty with the multicognitive approach, in addition to being the approach least supported by Kant's text, is that this interpretation does not explain the connection between perceptual shifting and pleasure. That is, this interpretation does not explain why a play between the manifold and the multitude of concepts (shifting back and forth from one concept to another and not settling down to any of them) should be pleasurable, rather than confusing and irritating (ibid., p. 177).

⁷Guyer 2005, p. 149-150.

ing is recognized to satisfy the rules for the organization of that manifold dictated by the determinate concept or concepts on which our recognition and identification of the object of this experience depends. It is also a state of mind in which it is felt that—or as if—the understanding's underlying objective or interest in unity is being satisfied in a way that *goes beyond* anything required for or dictated by satisfaction of the determinate concept or concepts on which mere identification of the object depends.⁸

Accordingly, in order for an object to induce aesthetic pleasure, first the necessary conditions of cognition must be satisfied. That is, we must recognize the object under some specific concept. Free harmony is produced only if this cognitive harmony, by which identification of an object takes place, exhibits an extra amount of unity, exceeding the basic unity that is required for ordinary cognition.

Guyer's approach reconciles Kant's theory of concepts as rules necessary for perceptual experience and his theory of free harmony necessary for judgments of the beautiful. Even though perception is governed by concepts, and to this extent it is not free, it can still attain freedom by exhibiting unity to a high degree. Accordingly, not all objects are beautiful, only those that have this high degree of unity. This explains why only some objects belonging to a given kind (determined by a given concept) are beautiful, while others are not. For example, this chair is beautiful, but not the other, even though they apply the same concept. Nonetheless, Guyer's approach is not fully satisfactory. Let me point out four main difficulties that his interpretation faces.

3.1 Perfection

I want to argue that Guyer's explanation of free harmony as a further degree of cognitive harmony is not convincing in light of Kant's views about perfection. My reasoning is the following: according to Kant's theory of perception, cognitive agreement between imagination and understanding is necessary for the recognition of an object to take

⁸Guyer 2006, p. 182-183.

place. For example, my recognition of an object as a tree depends on recognizing the common properties that all trees have in common (they all have properties such as leaves, branches, and trunks as specified by the concept of a tree). Kant writes that this agreement between cognitive powers can be exercised in different degrees or proportions (§21).

Henry Allison gives a fine explanation as to what these degrees of cognitive powers in perceptual experience amount to.⁹ Allison claims that because imagination and understanding are characterized by different objectives, one by particularity and the other by universality respectively, they pull in different directions, and therefore friction between them often occurs. This happens, he writes, when the apprehension of the manifold is atypical and therefore subsumption under the concept is more difficult to obtain. For example, it is more difficult to recognize an image of a three-legged dog as a dog than an image of a dog that satisfies all the prototypical features of a dog. This is an example of perceptual experience with a low or minimal degree of agreement between cognitive powers. On the other hand, an image of a dog that satisfies all of the prototypical properties of a dog is an experience of cognitive powers being in a higher degree of agreement. The object is immediately recognized as a dog. Accordingly, a low or high degree of cognitive harmony amounts to the level of difficulty of perceptual recognition of an object. An image of a three-legged dog is more difficult to recognize than the image of a four-legged dog.

But Guyer claims that a high degree of cognitive harmony is the kind of free harmony that produces an experience of pleasure. If this is true, then it follows that every object which represents a perfect instance of the kind it belongs to must be experienced with pleasure. But this seems wrong. I may recognize with ease an image that exemplifies all the essential conditions of, say, a turkey, or an equally perfect instance of a dog, but it is not true that I find them necessarily beautiful. On the contrary, even the perfect instance of a turkey is displeasing. Hence, despite the fact that there is a high cognitive harmony between the imagination and understanding in these cases,

⁹Allison 2001, p. 48-50.

there is no pleasure.

The opposite is also the case. There are objects that are more difficult to recognize under the concept, and therefore have a low degree of cognitive harmony, yet they are pleasing. For example, identifying a flower called *Rafflesia* as a flower is more difficult, since it does not have stems or leaves and therefore it does not satisfy all of the prototypical conditions of the concept of a flower. Yet it still has a pleasing appearance. This idea is in fact explicitly acknowledged by Kant in §15, where he distinguishes between two different kinds of judgments: judgments of taste and judgments of qualitative perfection. Kant claims that even though judgments of qualitative perfection may be accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, as when we see an object that exemplifies all the essential features of the kind to which it belongs, this is not, however, the pleasure of the beautiful. Judgments of qualitative perfection are kinds of cognitive judgments, because they depend on the concept of the object; while judgments of taste are aesthetic judgments, depending on the feeling of pleasure (or displeasure) alone. Kant tells us that

the judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, i.e., one that rests on subjective grounds, and its determining ground cannot be a concept, and thus not a concept of a determinate end. Thus by beauty, as a formal subjective purposiveness, there is not conceived any perfection of the object. (§15, 5:228)

Accordingly, this means that perceiving an object as a perfect instance of the kind to which it belongs does not mean that we find it beautiful, and finding an object beautiful does not suggest that this object is a perfect instance of its kind. One can find certain forms of flower beautiful, even if they are flawed examples of flowers. Or, one can find certain flowers displeasing, even though they represent a perfect example of the flower. Therefore, high cognitive harmony cannot simply be identified with free harmony and with beauty, as Guyer claims.

3.2 Kind-specific beauty

Guyer's explanation of free harmony cannot explain the possibility that there are multiple objects belonging to the same kind and that each example of this kind could be pleasing. That is, Guyer's account requires that beautiful objects have certain properties that distinguish them from aesthetically indifferent members of their kind. Guyer claims that an object is beautiful if it exceeds the minimal unity required for the recognition of the object as a member of its kind. Accordingly, a rose is beautiful if it has more unity than is needed for an ordinary experience of a rose, while a rose that does not have this additional harmony is an indifferent rose.¹⁰ But there is at least a possibility that there are kinds whose members are all beautiful. For example, one could make a strong case for the claim that all roses are beautiful. Hence, nothing further is required to find a rose beautiful than what is minimally required to recognize that it is a member of its kind. An ordinary experience of a rose is an experience of a beautiful rose. But if this is even a possibility, then Guyer's account is not fully successful.

3.3 Universal validity

Guyer's reading does not fully meet Kant's argument for the universal validity of judgments of taste. Kant derives the universal validity of judgments of taste from the state of mind that underlies cognition, because only this state of mind can be shared by all of us. But Guyer identifies free harmony with cognitive harmony exercised to a high degree. And this means that he distinguishes between different degrees of cognitive harmony. If what is required for cognition is some basic degree of harmony, then it does not strictly speaking follow that a degree of harmony, which exceeds the basic organization of the manifold, will also attain universal validity. Guyer claims that free harmony is a harmony that exceeds the normal requirement for cognition, and this implies that free harmony is not a requirement for cognition. And if this is so, then it does not necessarily follow that free harmony is universally communicable.

¹⁰Guyer 2008, p. 232.

3.4 Ugliness

Guyer's metacognitive approach cannot accommodate pure judgments about ugliness into the overall Kantian aesthetic picture.¹¹ If aesthetic harmony is a high degree of cognitive harmony, and if a lower degree of cognitive harmony is sufficient (given the basic degree of harmony required for cognition) for the occurrence of aesthetically indifferent objects, then the only possibility left for ugliness is to depend on a lack of cognitive harmony. But this is not possible according to Kant's epistemological theory; an object without cognitive harmony would be an object of which we could not be conscious. Hence, judgments of ugliness are impossible.¹²

Accordingly, Guyer proposes that experience of ugliness depends on some other source. He suggests three such sources. An object is ugly because, either (i) its sensory elements are displeasing (such as taste, touch, simple sound, or color), (ii) it is displeasurable because it is in disagreement with our moral standards, or (iii) an object's form is displeasurable because it is in disagreement with the concept of purpose, that is, with the idea of how an object's form should look. As an example of the ugliness of types (i) and (ii), Guyer puts forward Kant's example of the devastations of war. Devastations of war are ugly because they cause physical pain and are therefore disagreeable to our

¹¹The impossibility of accommodating judgments of ugliness into the Kantian aesthetic picture is not a problem merely for Guyer's metacognitive approach, but for Kant's theory of taste as well. Among Kant scholars, there are two main objections to the idea that judgments of ugliness are possible within Kantian aesthetics. The first objection was made by David Shier, who claimed that accommodation of the state of mind required for judgments of ugliness is inconsistent with Kant's argument for the universal validity of judgments of taste. In short, Shier claims that, according to Kant's argument, the state of mind on which judgments of taste depend can be nothing else but the free harmony of cognitive powers. But free harmony produces pleasure. But this means that that the universal state of mind of judgments of taste can only be the state of mind that produces pleasure. Consequently, judgments of taste are judgments of the beautiful alone (Shier 1998, p. 416). The second objection was made by Guyer, who claimed that the state of mind required for judgments of ugliness is inconsistent with Kant's epistemological theory. His argument is based on the premise that according to Kant's theory a conceptual harmony between imagination and understanding is required not only for cognition, but in order to have an experience of the object in the first place. The possibility of a state mind of sheer disharmony, required for judgments of ugliness, is therefore epistemologically precluded (Guyer 2005, p. 145-147).

¹²See Guyer 2005, p. 146-147; Rind 2002, p. 28.

senses, and because they violate our moral standards.¹³

Ugliness of type (iii) is where an object's formal qualities are in disagreement with our idea of how it should look (category-dependent ugliness). For example, Guyer writes: "... an asymmetry that we might find beautiful in an Art Nouveau home could strike us as hideous in a Renaissance church, or a sequence of notes that we might accept in an atonal piece by Schonberg might be jarring in a sonata by Hayden."¹⁴ In this case it is not formal qualities by themselves that cause displeasure, but displeasure is caused because they fail to fulfill our preconceived expectations of how an object should look.

Even though Guyer's account of ugliness is at least plausible for some cases of displeasure (and it is true that we do sometimes find objects ugly because they deviate from our established standards), it cannot, however, account for all of them. In order for there to be category-dependent ugliness of an object's form, there must in the first place be a standard for how an object should look. It is true, for example, that regarding the human face we have a standard of how a face should look. But this does not mean that for every object's form that we find ugly we also have an idea of how it should look.

Even if we have a concept with which we can categorize an object, this does not necessarily mean that a dependent aesthetic standard can be derived from that concept, because the concept may simply be too general. For example, in the case of dance, a dependent aesthetic judgment can be made according to some standard only if the concept with which we are judging the bodily movements is sufficiently contentful. More specifically, we can judge whether a specific sequence of bodily movements is a beautiful or ugly ballet on one hand, and also whether the same sequence of movements is a beautiful or ugly Polynesian war dance, because the standards are sufficiently contentful in each case. That the aesthetic evaluations made on the basis of the respective standards is likely to be different even given the same sequence of movements shows that these are indeed aesthetic evaluations dependent on a standard. However, it is not the case that simply

¹³Guyer 2005, p. 151.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 151.

because we can categorize an object under a concept that this necessarily supplies us with a standard against with which a dependent aesthetic judgment can be made. The concept of dance, for instance, is not on its own contentful enough to supply us with such a standard. If all that it is known about the sequence of bodily movements is that it is a dance, we have no standard with which to make a dependent aesthetic evaluation, but we can still judge it to be ugly.

The case is similar for paintings, because the objects belonging to this category are so fundamentally various that the categorization of an object as a painting is on its own again insufficient to supply us with a standard, despite our being able to find a painting ugly—even though we categorize it no more specifically than as a painting. The case with paintings is especially clear in the case of abstract art, where the freedom of form within the medium is so broad that no prior determinate idea of what such a painting should look like can be given. An abstract painting is just lines and colors, and it is not credible to say that we have some idea of what lines and colors *should* look like. However, we can find some composition of lines and colors ugly even though we have no standard for it (for example, Karel Appel's *Untitled*, 1957).

Furthermore, dependent ugliness, according to Guyer, comes from an object not satisfying criteria specified by its concept, that is, the idea of how it should look. But there can be cases where an object is ugly even if it does satisfy our expectations as to how it should look. For example, an animal called *anglerfish* can satisfy completely the criteria belonging to the concept of an anglerfish, while nevertheless being ugly, because even the most perfect specimen of an anglerfish is an ugly animal. The anglerfish is judged to be one of the most grotesque sea creatures, by virtue of its black body, disproportionately large head, wide open jaw and long, sharp teeth. It is this distinctive combination of features that makes the anglerfish so displeasing, even though these features are shared by all members of this natural kind. Such cases of ugliness do not fit into Guyer's definition of displeasure. Moreover, it is also incorrect to say that we find all displeasure of the senses ugly. For example, if a violinist plays a tone wrongly, I do not

necessarily find such a tone ugly, but merely discomforting or uneasy to my ear. Also, painful sensory stimuli are displeasurable, but few, if any, of these could really be called ugly. Therefore not all displeasures of the senses are ugly. Accordingly, Guyer's metacognitive interpretation of free harmony fails to give an adequate explanation of ugliness in Kant's aesthetics and is, therefore, ultimately unsuccessful.

4 Conclusion

To conclude, Guyer's metacognitive interpretation does not offer a full and satisfactory account of the notion of free play in Kant's aesthetics, because it cannot accommodate the following three beliefs that Kant seems to hold.

First, that judgments of taste are not determined by the concept of the object, and hence that they do not depend on the object's satisfaction of the essential conditions of the kind to which it belongs. But one consequence of Guyer's account of free harmony as a high degree of cognitive harmony is that every object that represents a perfect instance of its kind must be beautiful. Hence, Guyer's account is inadequate for a comprehensive interpretation of the notion of free play.

Second, that free play is similar enough to the play of cognitive powers in cognition that it can attain universal validity, and it is dissimilar enough that it does not necessarily accompany every object of cognition. Some objects of cognition do not have free play. Guyer's interpretation satisfies the latter criterion by claiming that free harmony exceeds the minimal conditions required for ordinary cognition, and therefore not all objects of cognition are beautiful. However, if free harmony exceeds the normal conditions required for cognition, then it follows that free harmony is not required for cognition, and therefore it cannot satisfy the requirement of universality.

Third, that there are pure judgments of ugliness. Even though accommodating judgments of ugliness into Kant's theory of taste is problematic, there is nevertheless implicit and explicit textual evidence that Kant acknowledged judgments of ugliness as pure judgments of taste. Guyer's metacognitive interpretation, however, cannot accom-

moderate pure judgments about ugliness.

Taking all of these points together, a deeper examination and reevaluation of Kant's notion of free play is required than has been given thus far.

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